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Part I
Introduction and Summary of Results
1
1 Introduction
The return of an investment is often positively correlated with the amount of risk taken. In sim-
pler words, there is no return without risk. So, a wise investor might consider including risk as
a driver to his investment decisions. But which type of risk should an investor consider? This
dissertation focuses on risk-based investment decisions by considering three different types of risk:
regulatory risk, market risk, and estimation risk. Regulatory risk, hardly estimable from historical
data, reflects how changes in the regulatory environment might impact the profitability of a par-
ticular asset class, sector, or even a single company. Market risk emerges from the fluctuations of
the market-assigned values of stocks, bonds, commodities, etc. Estimation risk materializes due to
natural constraints such as lack of data and a large investment universe at the time of an investment
decision.
Three research papers constitute this dissertation, and they are briefly described in the following:
(i) Capital Floors, the Revised SA and the Cost of Loans in Switzerland
(with William Perraudin, and Peng Yang),
(ii) Maximum Diversification Strategies Along Commodity Risk Factors
(with Markus Leippold, and Harald Lohre),
(iii) Second Order Risk In Alternative Risk Parity Strategies
(with Markus Leippold, and Harald Lohre),
2 Summary of Results
(i) Capital Floors, the Revised SA and the Cost of Loans in Switzerland
The first research article of this dissertation looks at regulatory risk, an often neglected source
of risk within the process of portfolio construction. This article especially focuses on the revision
of the standardized approach to credit risk-weighted assets calculation and also on the possible
introduction of a system of capital floors within Switzerland. The regulatory reform is found to
produce shifts in levels of capital requirements as well as shifts in capital requirements across banks
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and asset classes. We find that the reform over-penalizes asset classes like income-producing real
estates and corporate lending in Switzerland.
(ii) Maximum Diversification Strategies Along Commodity Risk Factors
The second research article focuses on mitigating market risk within the commodity market. This
paper analyses commodity portfolio construction strategies on the basis of uncorrelated risk fac-
tor decompositions of the underlying investment universe. Leveraging on the current literature,
we propose a new portfolio construction strategy with diversification characteristics similar to the
diversified risk parity strategy, with additional benefits of a lower portfolio turnover and a stable
risk exposure. This is obtained by equally allocating risk to a portfolio which closely tracks an
economically feasible commodity factor model.
(iii) Second Order Risk In Alternative Risk Parity Strategies
The third research article investigates the second-order risk bias, a bias related to estimation risk,
in portfolio construction. This bias can be traced in the systematic underestimation of portfolio
volatility in samples during portfolio construction. It might materialize especially in modern port-
folio theory due to the latters reliance on pure statistical portfolio construction strategies. The
minimum variance portfolio, as documented in the literature, is not the only strategy to suffer from
this bias. In this paper we show how alternative risk parity strategies also suffer from such bias
in their volatility estimation and accordingly propose a new portfolio strategy, known as portfolio
risk parity, which is immune to this bias.
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Part II
Capital Floors, the Revised SA and the Cost
of Loans in Switzerland
Simone Bernardi, William Perraudin, and Peng Yang
This paper was presented at
• UBS A.G. Brown Bag Seminar, Zurich, Switzerland (August 2015)
• Brown Bag Lunch Seminar at University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland (April 2016)
Abstract
The Basel Committee plans to revise the Standardised Approach (SA) to bank capital for credit
risk and to employ the revised SA as a floor for bank capital based on internal models. The changes
are likely to have a major impact on the overall level of capital and its distribution across banks
and asset classes. This paper examines the effects of the proposed changes in capital rules on the
Swiss loan market. Using primarily public information, we estimate the effects on the capital of
individual Swiss banks broken down by asset class. We infer what this is likely to imply for lending
rates in the Swiss market. We find that the proposed rule changes would substantially boost capital
overall, affecting most severely capital for Corporate and Specialised Lending exposures. Under the
BCBS 347 proposals, total bank capital would rise 39% while capital for Corporate and Specialised
Lending exposures would increase by 142% and 130%, respectively. This allocation of capital across
asset classes is inconsistent with the lessons of the recent financial crisis which was triggered by the
collapse of the US residential mortgage market and involved relatively little impact on the quality
of corporate credit. By our calculations, bank spreads for corporate loans would rise by between
63 and 103 basis points.
Keywords: Credit Risk, Regulation, Banks, Public Institutions
JEL Classification: G21; G28
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1 Introduction
The Basel Committee has recently published proposals for major revisions in an important compo-
nent of regulatory capital rules, the credit risk Standardised Approach (SA). Under the Committees
initial proposals (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014b), also known as BCBS 307),
risk weights for Bank, Corporate and Residential Mortgage exposures would depend on the values
of risk indicators, specific to the exposure in question.1 Recently, the Committee has issued a
new version of its proposals retreating from the extensive use of risk indicators (see BCBS (2015),
known as BCBS 347). The Basel Committee also published in December 2014 a consultation paper
on the use of capital floors (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014a), also known as
BCBS 306). In this, the authorities aim to “tidy up” discrepancies across regulatory jurisdictions
in the approach taken to capital floors. When the Basel II rules came into force, regulators applied
a temporary capital floor equal to a declining fraction of Basel I capital levels. Following the crisis,
this was retained in various forms in different jurisdictions. Since it is imposed at a bank level and
is worked out excluding Basel III capital categories such as CVA, in practice, it does not bind many
large banks and plays a limited role in pricing decisions.
Regulators regard capital floors as a way of enforcing greater uniformity of risk weight calcu-
lations across banks. The Basel Committee has, for some time, expressed dissatisfaction with the
inconsistency across banks of capital calculated using internal models (including Internal Ratings-
Based Approach (IRBA) credit risk capital calculations). Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(2013), for example, documents such inconsistencies, presenting banks’ IRBA risk weight calcula-
tions for a set of reference exposures.2 The authorities have engaged in other policy steps to reduce
inconsistencies in capital calculations including an extensive set of evaluation exercises referred to
as the Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program (RCAP). The effectiveness of this and parallel
industry benchmarking activities in improving consistency has yet to be established. But, the au-
1For example, for residential mortgages, the risk indicators that the authorities propose to use as the basis for
regulatory capital are Loan to Value (LTV) and Debt Service Coverage (DSC) ratios. More information on the risk
indicators may be found in Section 2.
2Reportedly, some senior regulators from countries in which the recent crisis had little or no impact have worried
about the low default probabilities that banks have estimated and, hence, the low IRBA risk weights that are currently
being used.
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thorities have decided to push ahead by implementing systematically capital floors based on revised
SA rules.
While they have attracted little attention outside risk and regulation specialists, the BCBS 306
and 307 proposals may have far-reaching implications for banks and the economies in which they
operate.3 In particular, the new rules will shift capital between SA and IRB banks and across asset
classes. Understanding the nature of these shifts and the economic implications is an important
topic of study.4 TThe Basel Committee organised an official Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) for
the BCBS 306 and BCBS 307 version of the proposed new rules but many banks found it difficult
to obtain the data necessary to calculate capital accurately. So, the reliability of the QIS, the
results of which are in any case confidential, is open to doubt. A new QIS is currently taking place
following publication of BCBS 347.
In this paper, we examine the implications of both the 2014 and 2015 versions of the proposals
for a particular loan market, that of Switzerland. Primarily using public data, we investigate which
banks and asset classes would attract higher or lower capital under the proposed changes. We then
proceed to analyse how the changes in capital will affect lending rates. We focus on Swiss banks
exposures to Banks, Corporates, Commercial and Residential Mortgage and Specialised Lending
exposures located in Switzerland. We study the effects of the proposals on the capital and lending
rates of 37 group or individual banks. These include the main suppliers of loans in the Swiss
market: two large IRBA banks, UBS and Credit Suisse; a large network SA bank, Raiffeisen
(which is particularly active in residential mortgage lending); a group of Cantonal banks of varying
size (that are all SA with one IRBA exception); and a group of other SA banks.5 We perform
quantitative impact analysis of the proposals using data published by these 37 banks through
their Pillar 3 disclosures and financial statements, calculating the implied changes in the capital
3It is worth noting that, following the crisis, the Basel Committee adopted major changes to the Basel II (see BCBS
(2006)) capital definitions and capital target ratios. But, aside from the area of trading book rules, these changes
(see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a), (2009b) and (2010b)) involved relatively minor changes in
the definitions of Risk Weighted Assets (RWAs). The changes proposed in BCBS 307 are the first major post-crisis
reform in RWAs.
4One may also be concerned that basing regulatory capital on accounting-data-related risk indicators will shift
capital between sectors and jurisdictions in ways that depend more on differences in accounting practice than risk. In
some countries, difficulties in obtaining the data necessary to calculate the indicators will mean that capital defaults
to punitive values.
5In our results, we aggregate Raiffeisen with the Other SA Banks.
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individual banks apply to different asset classes. The private data we employ consists of estimates,
supplied to us by UBS, of the distribution of its lending within Switzerland conditional on credit
quality and the revised SA risk drivers. Using the above information, we first perform top-down
calculations of how one might expect individual banks risk weights for each of several asset classes
to be affected by the introduction of the BCBS 307 and BCBS 347 rules and the BCBS 306 capital
floors regime. Second, we analyse the impact of the capital changes on the spreads that banks
charge in different sectors of the Swiss loan market. Third, we calculate the immediate, direct
monetary cost of the rule changes as the product of spread changes and current volumes. We do
this in annual flow terms and also as a discounted sum of future costs.
To infer the impact of increased capital on spreads, we calculate the cost of bank equity em-
ploying the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) suggested by Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson (2010)
and subsequently used by Miles, Yang, and Marcheggiano (2012) and Junge and Kugler (2013).
This approach yields not just a calculation of the initial cost of equity but also an estimate of
how that cost of equity may change as a bank increases its capital. In contrast to these other
authors, we examine the impact of capital changes explicitly distinguishing between the costs of
equity of individual banks. Our most important finding is that the proposed changes in the capital
rules would significantly boost the spreads that banks charge to Corporate and Specialised Lending
borrowers. We also conclude that the changes would significantly improve the relatively compet-
itive position of the Cantonal Banks vis-a`-vis the two large Swiss banks. The increase in capital
and cost of lending to Corporates runs counter to one of the policy lesson of the recent crisis in
which corporate loans performed well in many countries while residential mortgages contributed,
at least in the US, to major instability. They are also inconsistent with recent concerns voiced by
policy-makers in Switzerland about dangers of over-heating in the residential mortgage market.6
One may note that the regulatory landscape for Swiss banks is evolving not just because of
the rule changes discussed in this paper. Examples of other developments include the phased
6For example, OECD (2012) (see page 12) discusses concerns of over-heating in the Swiss housing market. Brown
and Guin (2013) examine the sensitivity of Swiss mortgage borrowers to interest rate and house price changes in
the light of concerns about the stability of the market expressed by policy-makers. They find that these sensitivities
are potentially serious in the long run although less important in the short or medium term. Bourassa, Hoesli, and
Scognamiglio (2012) describe features of the Swiss housing market that made it more stable prior to the crisis and
hence less subject to price falls afterwards, including the conservative lending practices of Swiss banks.
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introduction of Basel leverage ratios, alterations in trading book regulations and the minimum
Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) rules. Here, we focus on the revised credit risk SA and its
interaction with proposed capital floors since these changes have attracted relatively little attention
and yet have the potential to alter very substantially the distribution and level of bank capital.
This paper is a contribution to a substantial literature on the impact of alterations in regulatory
capital rules on aggregate bank capital and the wider economy. Repullo and Suarez (2004) and
Ruthenberg and Landskroner (2008) examine the effects of the introduction of the Basel II rules
on lending rates, focusing on how a bank’s choices between SA and IRBA approaches would affect
outcomes. Recent papers by Elliott (2009), King (2010), Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson (2010), Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2010a), Macroeconomic Assessment Group (2010), Institute
of International Finance (2011), Cosimano and Hakura (2011), Slovik and Cournde (2011), Miles,
Yang, and Marcheggiano (2012), Junge and Kugler (2013), Backler and Wurgler (2013) and Basten
and Koch (2014) study the economic effects of the increases in capital envisaged in Basel III.
Other studies have examined the dynamics of bank lending and capital econometrically. Early
studies include Hancock, Laing, and Wilcox (1995), Peek and Rosengren (1995) and Ediz, Michael,
and Perraudin (1998). More recent analyzes include Mora and Logan (2010), Francis and Osborne
(2012) and Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell (2011). For other relevant studies see for example Bassett,
Chosak, Driscoll, and Zakrajˆsek (2010), who examine how bank loan supply shocks feed through
into real economic activity. This study may also be viewed as a contribution to the literature on
the Swiss banking market. This includes among other significant studies Neuberger and Schacht
(2005), Dietrich (2009), Dietrich and Wanzenried (2010), Rochet (2014) discusses studies of the
economic impact of capital rules in the context of Swiss bank regulation.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the proposal changes in capital rules.
Section 3 details how we map the Basel BCBS 306, 307 and 347 proposals into estimates of changes
in the capital individual banks will hold against exposures in different asset classes. Section 4
explains how we analyse the impact on spreads, again by bank and asset class. Section 5 presents
the results of our calculations. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains information on how
we estimate risk driver distribution for Swiss bank exposures to other Swiss banks in the context
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of BCBS 307 rules and the distribution of unrated loans that we employ in implementing BCBS
347 rules.
2 The Revised SA and Capital Floors
2.1 Background
This paper examines the impact on the Swiss loan market of the proposed changes in bank capital
rules set out in BCBS 306, 307 and 347.7 This involves calculating the impact on capital for
differentbanks and asset classes and then analysing how this will affect the spreads at which banks
lend. We begin by providing background to the Basel Committees proposals.
The existing credit risk SA is employed by banks that choose, subject to regulatory approval,
to use less sophisticated approaches to calculating regulatory capital. The SA includes a set of
asset-class specific risk weights that banks apply to their exposures to calculate their credit-related
Risk Weighted Assets (RWAs). A banks required capital is then calculated by multiplying its total
RWA by a capital target ratio. Under Basel I and II rules, banks apply target ratios of 4% and
8%, respectively, to their RWAs to derive their required Tier I and Tier II capital. Under Basel
III, the system of capital target ratios is more complex and includes elements based on a Capital
Conservation Buffer and a Counter-Cyclical Buffer as well as additional percentages for Systemically
Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). Risk weights in the existing credit risk SA are relatively
insensitive to risk in that they vary across, but not within, broad asset classes. Exceptions are
exposures to rated corporate, bank or sovereign borrowers for which risk weights are determined,
based on the exposures credit rating, using look-up tables.
When Basel II was introduced, in order to prevent a possible, sudden reduction in capital levels
for some institutions, a Basel I capital floor was included. Under this approach, a bank’s required
capital equals the maximum of its Basel II level and a percentage of the Basel I level (see BCBS
7Basel rule changes like those proposed in BCBS 306 and 307 are rarely subjected to detailed, public analysis.
The authorities current approach involves calibration efforts internal to the regulatory community followed by QIS
exercises employing data provided by banks. But, the calibration exercises and the results of QIS analysisare rarely
disclosed in any detail. Academics have analysed important packages of measures such as Basel III capital changes
but their studies are typically performed long after decisions have been made.
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(2006) paragraph 45). The Basel Committee intended that the Basel I floor be temporary. It was
planned that the percentage used in the floor definition would fall over time from 95% in 2007,
to 90% in 2008 and then to 80% in 2009, after which the floor would be dropped. Following the
2007 crisis, however, some jurisdictions decided to maintain the Basel I floor. For example, the
European Union determined to retain an 80% Basel I floor, at least until 2017 (see Article 500 of
the Credit Risk Regulation (CRR) in European Parliament (2013)).8 Switzerland also retained the
Basel I floor after 2009. The fact that the Basel I floor operates on total bank capital and excludes
important new Basel III capital components (such as CVA-related capital) means that for large
banks, the Basel I floor does not bind and plays a limited role in banks’ loan pricing decisions.
2.2 The BCBS 307 risk weights
Key elements of BCBS 307 that are material to our analysis are the risk weight look-up tables for
exposures in individual asset classes. While the existing SA bases risk weights on agency ratings
(where available) or employs simple undifferentiated risk weights for wide classes of exposures,
under the revised SA, the Basel authorities propose in BCBS 307 to calculate risk weights on the
basis of risk indicators consisting of financial ratios. For Bank Exposures, the risk indicators are the
Core Equity Tier 1 ratio of the counter-party bank and the ratio of Net Non-Performing Assets to
total loans. Table 1 shows the risk weights, proposed in BCBS 307, for exposures that have CET1
and NNPA ratios in particular, specified ranges. One may observe that the risk weights range from
30% to 300%, a substantial “times 10” range from least to most risky banks.
8Even when jurisdictions operate a Basel I floor, they may do so in different ways. In the European CRR
formulation of the floor (see European Parliament (2013), Basel II capital must exceed a percentage of Basel I
capital. In contrast, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) envisages that Basel II risk weights exceed a
percentage of Basel I risk weights. Borchgrevink (2012) shows, through examples, that floors based on capital levels
are markedly less conservative than floors based on risk weights.
10
Table 1
RSA risk weights for bank exposures
The table, reproduced from BCBS 307, shows the risk weights banks must use for exposures to other banks
under the revised credit risk SA. The risk weights depend on the Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio and
Net Non-Performing Asset (NNPA) ratio of the bank in question.
NNPA ratio NNPA ratio NNPA ratio
(.) ≤ 1% 1% < (.) ≤ 3% 3% < (.)
CET1 ratio ≥ 12% 30% 45% 60%
12% > CET1 ratio ≥ 9.5% 40% 60% 80%
9.5% > CET1 ratio ≥ 7% 60% 80% 100%
7% > CET1 ratio ≥ 5.5% 80% 100% 120%
5.5% > CET1 ratio ≥ 4.5% 100% 120% 140%
CET1 ratio < 4.5% 300% 300% 300%
If the data required for a bank to calculate capital for an exposure to another bank on this
basis is not available (for example, because the obligor bank does not possess Basel III consistent
RWA data and, hence, cannot publish a CET1 ratio), the default risk weight value is 300%. This
approach contrasts with the current SA in which if a rating is not available, risk weights equal
the Basel I level of 100%. For Corporate Loans, the capital indicators proposed in BCBS 307 are
Revenue and a Leverage ratio (defined as total assets over common equity). Table 2 shows the risk
weights for different risk indicator ranges. In this case, proposed risk weights range from 60% to
300%, i.e., a “5 times” proportional variation. Leverage is a particularly controversial indicator to
use since it varies so much across sectors without corresponding observed variation in default rates
and loss given default.
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Table 2
Risk weights for corporate exposures
The table, reproduced from BCBS 307, shows the risk weights banks must use for exposures to corporates
under the revised credit risk SA. The risk weights depend on the obligor’s leverage (the total liabilities to
equity ratio) and on gross revenue.
Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue
(.) ≤ 5m 5m < (.) ≤ 50m 50m < (.) ≤ 1bn (.) > 1m
Leverage 1x− 3x 100% 90% 80% 60%
Leverage 3x− 5x 110% 100% 90% 70%
Leverage > 5x 130% 120% 110% 90%
Negative Equity (*) 300% 300% 300% 300%
Tables 3 and 4 show the risk weights, proposed by the Basel authorities, for exposures to
Commercial and Residential Mortgages. The risk weights in both cases depend on Loan to Value
(LTV) ratios while Residential Mortgage risk weights also depend on Debt Service Coverage ratios.
Table 3
RSA risk weights for commercial mortgages
The table, reproduced from BCBS 307, shows the risk weights banks must hold, under the revised credit
risk SA against exposures to commercial mortgages. Risk weights depend on Loan to Value (LTV) ratios.
LTV < 60% 60% ≤ LTV < 75% 75% ≤ LTV
75% 100% 120%
The revised SA further defines so called Specialised Lending exposures. These are exposure
types deemed to be particularly risky and are subject to a conservative non-risk-differentiated risk
weight. Among others, Income Producing Real Estate (IPRE), Commodity Trade Finance (CTF)
and Land Acquisition (LA) given certain conditions might qualify as Specialised Lending exposures,
receiving 120%, 120% and 150% risk weights, respectively.
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Table 4
RSA risk weights for residential mortgages
The table, reproduced from BCBS 307, shows the risk weights banks must hold, under the revised credit
risk SA against exposures to residential mortgages. Risk weights depend on Loan to Value (LTV) and Debt
Service Coverage (DSC) ratios.
DSC ≤ 35% DSC > 35%
LTV < 40% 25% 30%
40% ≤ LTV < 60% 30% 40%
60% ≤ LTV < 80% 40% 50%
80% ≤ LTV < 90% 50% 70%
90% ≤ LTV < 100% 60% 80%
100% ≤ LTV < 4.5% 80% 100%
2.3 The BCBS 347 risk weights
In this section, we describe the changes that the Basel authorities made to their revised credit risk
SA proposals in BCBS 347 following a hostile industry response to BCBS 307. We begin with
risk weights for exposures to Banks. As explained above, under the BCBS 307 proposals, banks
determined risk weights for their exposures to other banks based on the obligor’s CET1 ratio and net
non-performing assets (NNPA) ratio. Most respondents to the Committees consultation accepted
the use of the CET1 ratio but many argued the NNPA ratio was not comparable across different
accounting regimes. Some thought that the two-risk driver approach was overly simplistic and
would result in a loss of risk information and others pointed out the elimination of dependence on
ratings was unnecessary and undesirable. In its BCBS 347 revision, the Committee acknowledged
the limitations of BCBS 307 and proposed that bank exposures be risk-weighted based on the
following hierarchy.
a. External Credit Risk Assessment Approach (ECRA)
Banks incorporated in jurisdictions that allow the use of external ratings for regulatory purposes
would assign to their rated bank exposures the corresponding Base risk weights depending upon
the external ratings as shown in Table 1. Bank exposures with maturity of three months or less
could be assigned a risk weight based on the second row in Table 5.
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Table 5
Risk weights for bank exposure (ECRA)
The table, reproduced from BCBS 347, shows the risk weights banks must hold, under the revised credit
risk SA against exposures to other banks. Risk weights depend on the availability of external ratings and
the tenor of the exposure.
External rating AAA to AA- A+ to A- BBB+ to BBB- BB+ to B- Below B-
“Base” risk weight 20% 50% 50% 100% 150%
Rw. short term 20% 20% 20% 50% 150%
b. Standardised Credit Risk Assessment Approach (SCRA)
Banks incorporated in jurisdictions that allow the use of external ratings for regulatory purposes
would classify their unrated bank exposures into one of three risk-weight buckets: Grades A, B and
C, using an approach termed the Standardised Credit Risk Assessment Approach (SCRA). Banks
incorporated in jurisdictions that do not permit use of external ratings for regulatory purposes
would apply the SCRA approach to all their bank exposures. Risk weights for SCRA are according
to Table 6.
Table 6
Risk weights for bank exposure (SCRA)
The table, reproduced from BCBS 347, shows the risk weights banks must hold, under the revised credit
risk SA against exposures to other banks. Risk weights depend on the credit risk assessment and the tenor
of the exposure.
Credit risk assessment Grade A Grade B Grade C
“Base” risk weight 50% 100% 150%
Risk weight for short term exposure 20% 50% 150%
We now turn to risk weights for Corporate exposures. In BCBS 307, as for Bank exposures,
Corporate-exposure risk weights are determined by a two-risk-driver approach, specifically revenue
and leverage. Respondents to the Committees consultation deemed the use of leverage inappropriate
without consideration of a corporates industry sector while the use of revenue was also criticised
as it would penalise SMEs. In response, in BCBS 347, the Committee proposes two approaches to
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apply the risk weights for corporate exposures.
a. For banks incorporated in jurisdictions that allow the use of external ratings for regulatory
purposes, the risk weights of corporate exposures will be determined according to Table 7.
Table 7
Risk weights for corporate exposure
The table, reproduced from BCBS 347, shows the risk weights banks must hold, under the revised credit
risk SA against exposures to corporates. Risk weights depend on the availability of external ratings.
External rating AAA A+ BBB+ BB+ Below Unrated
of counterparty to AA- to A- to BBB- to B- B-
“Base” risk weight 20% 50% 100% 100% 150% 100%
Unrated corporate SMEs would be assigned an 85% risk weight.
b. For banks incorporated in jurisdictions that don’t allow for external ratings for regulatory
purposes, banks will apply an 75% risk weight to all “investment grade” corporate exposures and
an 100% risk weight to all other corporate exposures.
For residential real estate, BCBS 307 proposed determining risk weights from two risk drivers:
the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and the debt servicing coverage (DSC). The use of LTV ratio was
generally supported by respondents to the Committee’s consultation but they expressed significant
concerns on the use of the DSC ratio due to the challenges of defining and calibrating the DSC
ratio. In BCBS 347, the Committee, therefore, decides to retain the LTV ratio as the risk driver
but not to use the DSC ratio (see Table 8). The risk weights would vary based on the exposures’
LTV ratio and also would depend on whether repayment is materially dependent on cash flows
generated by the property (see Table 8 and Table 9).
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Table 8
Risk weight for residential real estate exposures (when repayment is not materially
dependent on cash flows generated by property)
The table, reproduced from BCBS 347, shows the risk weights banks must hold, under the revised credit
risk SA against exposures to residential mortgages. This table applies when the repayment of the loan
is not materially dependent on cash flows generated by property. For residential real estate exposures to
individuals with an LTV ratio higher than 100% the risk weight applied will be 75%. For residential real
estate exposures to SMEs with an LTV ratio higher than 100% the risk weight applied will be 85%.
40% < 60% < 80% < 90% <
LTV LTV LTV LTV LTV LTV
≤ 40% ≤ 60% ≤ 80% ≤ 90% ≤ 100% > 100%
Risk weight 25% 30% 35% 45% 55% RW counterparty
Table 9
Risk weight for residential real estate exposures (Repayment is materially dependent
on cash flows generated by property)
The table, reproduced from BCBS 347, shows the risk weights banks must hold, under the revised credit
risk SA against exposures to residential mortgages. This table applies when the repayment of the loan is
materially dependent on cash flows generated by property.
60% <
LTV LTV LTV
≤ 60% ≤ 80% > 80%
Risk weight 70% 90% 120%
For commercial real estate exposures, to ensure consistency with residential real estate expo-
sures, the Committee proposes in BCBS 347 to assign risk weights based on the LTV ratio and on
whether repayment is materially dependent on cash flows generated by the property (see Table 10
and Table 11).
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Table 10
Risk weight for commercial real estate exposures (Repayment is not materially
dependent on cash flows generated by property)
The table, reproduced from BCBS 347, shows the risk weights banks must hold, under the revised credit
risk SA against exposures to commercial mortgages. This table applies when the repayment of the loan
is not materially dependent on cash flows generated by property. For commercial real estate exposures to
individuals with an LTV ratio higher than 60% the risk weight applied will be 75%. For residential real
estate exposures to SMEs with an LTV ratio higher than 60% the risk weight applied will be 85%.
LTV ≤ 60% LTV > 60%
Risk weight min(60%,RW of counterparty) RW of counterparty
Table 11
Risk weight for commercial real estate exposures (Repayment is materially
dependent on cash flows generated by property)
The table, reproduced from BCBS 347, shows the risk weights banks must hold, under the revised credit
risk SA against exposures to commercial mortgages. This table applies when the repayment of the loan is
materially dependent on cash flows generated by property.
LTV ≤ 60% LTV ≤ 80% LTV > 80%
Risk weight 80% 100% 130%
Last, for Specialised Lending exposures, BCBS 307 proposed to employ the following risk weights:
a. 120% to exposures against project finance, object finance, commodities finance and income-
producing real estate (IPRE) finance
b. 150% to exposures against land acquisition, development and construction(ADC) finance
In BCBS 347, to be consistent with the reintroduction of external ratings for risk-weighting
exposures to banks and corporate, the Committee proposes to permit use of issue-specific external
ratings for project finance, object finance and commodities finance. The applicable risk weight
would be determined by the same risk-weight look-up table that would apply to general corporate
exposures. The Committee also proposes to categorise IPRE exposures ADC exposures as real es-
tate exposures. IPRE will be treated as real estate exposures with repayment materially dependent
on cash flows generated by property. IPRE will either use risk weight look-up Table 9 or Table 11
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depending on the sub-category to which it belongs. ADC exposures would still be risk-weighted
at 150% but now would include loans to companies and individuals that are made to finance the
acquisition of finished property, where the repayment of the loan depends on the future uncertain
sale of the property. (We do not reflect this definition change in our calculations.)
2.4 Off balance sheet exposures in BSBC 307 and BCBS 347
An important aspect of the rule changes proposed in the revised credit risk SA concerns the Credit
Conversion Factors (CCFs) used for undrawn loan facilities. CCFs are used within the Basel system
to convert off-balance sheet exposures of various types to exposures at default comparable to those
of conventional drawn loans. BCBS 307 proposed to introduce a CCF of 10% for unconditionally
cancellable loan commitments. Previously, they had carried as CCF of zero. For the asset classes we
study in this paper, banks have generally regarded undrawn loan commitments as unconditionally
cancellable (UCC). The BCBS 307 proposed change therefore represented a small but possibly
significant increase in conservatism affecting SA banks directly and IRB banks because of the
proposed regime of SA-capital-based floors. BCBS 347, however, proposes a much more important
increase in conservatism in that the Committee proposes to apply a reduced CCF between 10%
and 20% only to retail commitments (e.g., credit cards). All other non-retail commitments that
are currently categorised as UCC would be treated as general commitments. These latter, which
would include undrawn loan facilities in the asset classes we study in this paper, would be subject
to a CCF of 50% to 75%, the precise calibration to be established in the future. Clearly, the
impact of this change both directly for SA banks and, indirectly for IRB banks via the proposed
SA-capital-floors regime, would be substantial.
3 Capital Impact Analysis
3.1 Breakdown of the Swiss loan market
This section describes how we infer the impact of the proposed capital rule changes in BCBS 306,
307 and 347 for different banks and asset classes. Table 12 shows the market shares that different
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categories of bank contribute to the main segments of the Swiss loan market. The pie charts that
appear in Figure 1 exhibit the same data as Table 12. One may observe that 70% of Corporate
Financing is supplied by the two Large Banks and the Cantonal Banks, the two categories of
bank providing roughly equal market shares. The Cantonal Banks have the largest share of the
market in Mortgages to Corporates followed by the Other Banks. The largest share of Mortgages
to Households is supplied by the Other Banks (which include Raiffeisen), followed by the Cantonal
Banks.
Table 12
Swiss credit market volume shares by bank category
Figures displayed are in CHF Million and pertain to the end of 2014. The data source is Swiss National
Bank (SNB) reports.9
Corporate Motrgage to Motrgage to Total
Banks Financing Corporate Households Motrgage
Large Banks 9, 167 48, 112 59, 211 197, 369 256, 580
Cantonal Banks 10, 360 45, 274 95, 645 220, 358 316, 003
Other 68, 535 40, 965 66, 512 257, 584 324, 096
All banks 88, 062 134, 351 221, 368 675, 311 896, 679
The pie charts that appear in Figure 1 exhibit the same data as Table 12.10
We wish to analyze bank loan exposure data in a disaggregated way.11 It is natural to work
with the standard regulatory categories such as: Sovereign, Bank, Corporate, Other Wholesale,
Retail Mortgage, Revolving Facilities and Other Retail. It is not practical, however, to examine
all of these categories because of data availability. We, therefore, focus our investigation on capital
10The data sources for Table 12 are as follows: The total domestic credit volume in Switzerland, as of December
2014, is CHF 1,066,136 million. The data source is the SNB report: Credit volume statistics domestic and foreign
available at http://www.snb.ch/ext/stats/bstamon/pdf/deen/Kreditstatistik_IABG.pdf. Figures on Exposure
to Banks come from the SNB report: http://www.snb.ch/ext/stats/bstamon/pdf/deen/Aktiven_I.pdf. Figures
on Total Mortgages also come from this report. As this report presents statistics for the total domestic and foreign
credit volumes, there is no breakdown by bank groups for domestic credit volume. We assume all foreign lending is
performed by Large Banks. Figures on Corporate Financing and Mortgages to Corporate come from SNB report:
Credit volume statistics domestic, to companies, by company size and type of loan. http://www.snb.ch/ext/stats/
bstamon/pdf/deen/Kreditstatistik_Betriebsgroessen.pdf. Figures on Mortgages to Households are calculated
as the difference between Total Mortgages and Mortgages to Corporates.
11It is particularly interesting to look at the effects of capital requirements broken down by loan type. Brun,
Fraisse, and Thesmar (2013) go even further by using loan level data to examine the effects of capital regulations on
lending. They find strong results of capital changes on lending.
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and spread impacts for the four key regulatory asset classes: Bank Exposures, Corporate Loans,
Commercial Mortgages and Residential Mortgages. In the case of IRB banks, we will also provide
some results on the impacts on several categories of Specialized Lending.12
Figure 1. Market shares of credit volume of banks in Swiss
Figures displayed are in CHF Million and pertain to the end of 2014. The data source is Swiss National
Bank (SNB) reports.
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To obtain accurate estimates of impacts on capital, it is necessary to break the loan volumes
down further, distinguishing loan exposure data based on (i) the approach the bank uses in calcu-
lating regulatory capital (IRB, SA, SRW and Other) and (ii) default probabilities (in the case of
IRBA loans) or risk weight bands (in the case of SA loans). We concentrate our analysis only on
IRBA and SA loans.
12Lack of detailed data on Specialized Lending for Credit Suisse obliges us to make the simplifying assumptions
that the bank’s exposure to the Specialized Lending category Income Producing Real Estate is the same as UBS, i.e.,
CHF 20billion.
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Table 13
List of banks covered in our study
The table displays the list of banks for which we analyse credit risk exposures to Bank, Corporate and
Mortgage Borrowers. The banks are categorised as Large banks, Cantonal banks and Other. The right
hand column provides information on whether the Pillar 3 Disclosures or Annual Report of the bank in
question contains break downs of credit exposures by PDs or risk weights.
Bank names Bank groups RW available
Credit Suisse Large banks YES
UBS Large banks YES
Reiffeisen Other YES
Aargauische Kantonalbank Cantonal banks YES
Appenzeller Kantonalbank Cantonal banks NO
Banca dello Stato del Cantone Ticino Cantonal banks YES
Banque Cantonale de Gene`ve Cantonal banks YES
Banque Cantonale du Jura Cantonal banks NO
Banque Cantonale Neuchaˆteloise Cantonal banks YES
Banque Cantonale Vaudoise Cantonal banks YES
Basellandschaftliche Kantonalbank Cantonal banks YES
Basler Kantonalbank Cantonal banks YES
Berner Kantonalbank Cantonal banks YES
Freiburger Kantonalbank Cantonal banks YES
Glarner Kantonalbank Cantonal banks NO
Graubundner Kantonalbank Cantonal banks YES
Luzerner Kantonalbank Cantonal banks YES
Nidwaldner Kantonalbank Cantonal banks NO
Obwaldner Kantonalbank Cantonal banks NO
Schaffauser Kantonalbank Cantonal banks YES
Schwyzer Kantonalbank Cantonal banks YES
St. Galler Kantonalbank Cantonal banks YES
Thurgauer Kantonalbank Cantonal banks YES
Urner Kantonalbank Cantonal banks NO
Walliser Kantonalbank Cantonal banks YES
Zuger Kantonalbank Cantonal banks YES
Zurcher Kantonalbank Cantonal banks YES
Bank J. Safra Sarasin Other NO
Bank Linth Other YES
Cembra Money Bank Other NO
Clientis Other YES
Coop Bank Other YES
Julius Baer Other YES
Migros Bank Other YES
Neue Aargauer Bank Other NO
Valiant Holding Other YES
WIR Other NO
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While helpful in showing the overall breakdown of the Swiss loan market in a timely fashion
(the data we exhibit is for end 2014), SNB data are not sufficiently disaggregated for us to employ
directly in our analysis.13 We, therefore, use individual bank data taken from the annual reports
and Pillar 3 disclosures of individual banks. The banks that we study (37 in number) are listed
in Table 6. Of these, three are IRB banks, namely Credit Suisse, Banque Cantonale Vaudoise and
UBS. Based on statements contained in either the bank’s annual report or Pillar 3 disclosures, we
consider all other banks to be following the SA in calculating credit risk capital.14
3.2 Calculating BCBS 307 revised credit risk SA risk weights
The data we obtain from annual reports and Pillar 3 disclosures pertains to end 2013. To bring the
data up to date, we rescale15 the exposure data so it is consistent with the more timely, end-2014
information in the SNB statistics displayed in Table 12. The rescaled individual bank level loan
volume data are displayed (in aggregated form) in Table 14. Because of the re-scaling, they, of
course, differ from those published in the banks’ 2013 annual reports and Pillar 3 disclosures.
13Aggregate statistics on the Swiss banking sector and loan markets may be found in Swiss National Bank (2012)
and (2013).
14The approach used by Basler Kantonalbank is unclear but we assume it primarily uses the SA. We are aware
that some other banks in Switzerland have IRB status at least for some aspects of their capital calculations. There
do not appear to be public disclosures that would permit us to allow for this in our study and it may be that the
banks in question do not use IRB approaches for the asset classes we consider here.
15We rescale the exposure amounts for banks other than the two largest banks (for which we have timely data) to
yield totals for the Raiffeisen and Cantonal Banks that equal those reported for end 2014 by the SNB. For Raiffeisen,
we aggregate the exposure amount for each asset class; we rescale the total exposure amount for each asset class to
match the SNB figures in Table 12. We are only able to rescale mortgages at the level of total mortgages. Since our
data on 37 banks does not cover all banks, we create two additional bank groups to represent cantonal banks and
other banks which are not covered in the 37 banks. The exposure amounts for the additional cantonal banks group
is calculated as the difference between the figures in Table 12 and the aggregated figures for each asset class for the
cantonal banks among our 37 banks. We suppose that their risk weights equal the weighted average of those we
derive for the cantonal banks among our 37 banks. For the Other Banks group, we create a group called additional
other banks and follow the same logic as for cantonal banks so as to cover all remaining banks. Raiffeisen is grouped
together with the Other Banks for the purpose of reporting results after all rescaling is complete.
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Table 14
Volume shares based on bank level data after re-scaling
Bank level data is only available for end 2013 except for the two large banks (for which end 2014 is available).
We rescale data for all except the two large banks so that the aggregates are consistent with end 2014
aggregate data published by the SNB. The resulting rescaled, bank level data is what we employ in our
analysis of the capital impact of the revised credit risk SA. Figures are in CHF millions.
Corporate Commercial Residential Total
Bank groups Banks Financing Mortgage Mortgage Motrgage
Large Banks 9, 167 48, 112 72, 837 183, 743 256, 580
Cantonal Banks 10, 360 45, 274 59, 575 256, 428 316, 003
Other 68, 535 40, 965 29, 525 294, 571 324, 096
All banks 88, 062 134, 351 161, 938 734, 741 896, 679
After rescaling, we decompose each banks asset-class-specific exposure data according to the PD
or risk weight (if this is available) information contained in the banks Annual Report or Pillar
3 Disclosures. For banks that do not publish default probability or risk weight breakdowns, we
assume that the breakdown by risk weights equals the weighted average risk weight breakdown of
banks for which the information is available.16 The right hand column of Table 13 shows whether
or not we were obliged to make such risk weight assumptions about a given bank. Using the
decomposed data for each bank, we proceed to calculate capital requirements using the revised SA
approach. The process involves the following steps.
1. For IRB banks, we infer default probabilities (PDs) from risk weights using the standard
Basel formula assuming values of loss given default (LGD) and maturity (MT).
2. For SA banks, we infer ratings from RW according to the look-up tables in the current SA
approach.
3. From the inferred ratings, we map the corresponding PD based on a default probability
master scale table provided by UBS (see Table 15).
4. We devise two rating buckets: AAA to A- and BBB+ to default.
16In the case of Banque Cantonale Vaudoise, a breakdown is provided only for the bank’s aggregated category:
“banks, corporates and other institutions”. We, therefore, assume that the bank and corporate exposures of this
bank have the same risk weight breakdown as the aggregate category.
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5. For each asset class that depends on two capital indicators, we estimate three joint distri-
butions: one unconditional distribution and two conditional distributions for the above two
rating buckets.
6. For each asset class, we associate to each of the exposure categories (broken down by credit
quality) a distribution of the two capital indicators conditional on their credit quality.
7. Given the look-up table in the revised SA paper, the indicator distribution and the loan
exposure at default, we calculate the risk weighted assets and capital requirement for the
loan book.
Table 15
Default probabilities
When a bank reports risk weights for a particular loan book, we infer the implied rating category using the
existing SA rules and then deduce a corresponding default probability (PD) using the master scale shown in
this table. The master scale was provided by UBS.
Rating PD Rating PD Rating PD
AAA 0.02% A− 0.08% BB− 2.70%
AA+ 0.04% BBB+ 0.17% B+ 4.60%
AA 0.04% BBB 0.17% B 7.75%
AA− 0.04% BBB− 0.35% B− 13.00%
A+ 0.08% BB+ 0.63% Cs 22.00%
A 0.08% BB 1.00% Default 100.00%
In this process, the distribution of exposures by risk indicator plays a crucial role. One may
reflect that a bank can calculate its revised SA capital without loan level information if it knows
its total exposure in each regulatory loan class and the fractions of those total exposures that fall
into each bucket defined by the risk indicator ranges specified in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4.
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Table 16
Generated joint distribution of CET1 and NNPA
To calculate capital under the revised credit risk SA, for a given bank, we need the breakdown of its exposures
according to the risk indicators specified in BCBS 307. For bank exposures, the relevant indicators are
Common Equity Tier 1 and Net Non-Performing Asset ratios. This table displays the distributions we
employed for estimating capital for bank exposures. The distributions differ for Large, Cantonal and Other
banks. The methodology employed in estimating these distributions is described in the Appendix.
CET1 ratio CET1 ratio CET1 ratio CET1 ratio CET1 ratio CET1 ratio
≥ 12% ≥ 9.5% ≥ 7% ≥ 5.5% ≥ 4.5% ≥ 4.5%
Large banks
NNPA ratio ≤ 1% 79.64% 1.25% 1.25% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1% < NNPA ratio ≤ 3% 13.21% 1.25% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
NNPA ratio > 3% 2.14% 1.25% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Cantonal banks
NNPA ratio ≤ 1% 81.52% 0.94% 0.94% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1% < NNPA ratio ≤ 3% 12.59% 0.94% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
NNPA ratio > 3% 2.14% 0.94% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Other banks
NNPA ratio ≤ 1% 83.39% 0.63% 0.63% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1% < NNPA ratio ≤ 3% 11.96% 0.63% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
NNPA ratio > 3% 2.14% 0.63% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
To calculate the revised SA capital for each bank in each regulatory asset class, we, therefore,
focus on estimating the distribution of loans in the Swiss market across the buckets defined in the
BCBS 307 and BCBS 347 tables. In the case of Swiss bank exposures to other Swiss banks, we
estimate this distribution based on a combination of public data and informed by guidance to us
from an expert with experience of Swiss interbank exposures. This estimation is described in the
Appendix. It leads to the distributions shown in Table 16. Almost all Swiss banks for which we have
data fall into the highest CET1 bucket given in Table 1 and one may presume that NNPA ratios
are very high. Given a judgment-based assumption of the distribution of Swiss bank lending to
other Swiss banks, we infer the fractions that Swiss banks in the categories: Large Banks, Cantonal
Banks and Other Banks, will have in each of the risk indicator buckets. These are displayed in
Table 16. To calculate the risk weights for individual banks implied by the revised SA, one must
take the sum of the products of elements in the relevant block of Table 9 with the risk weights
specified in Table 1. Let Nr and Nc be the number of categories corresponding to the row and
column risk indicators in the table, then the risk weights for the ith bank are:
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RWi =
Nr∑
r=1
Nc∑
c=1
pr,c,i × rwr,c. (1)
3.3 Calculating BCBS 347 revised credit risk SA risk weights
BCBS 347 makes some use of risk indicators (in the case of mortgages) but much less so than BCBS
307. Here, we set out the assumptions we make in inferring bank risk weights and capital for Swiss
banks under the BCBS 347 rules. We made the following assumptions for unrated bank exposures:
• All large banks are rated
• 50% Cantonal banks and other banks are unrated
• All unrated Cantonal banks are in Grade A
• 70% unrated other banks are in Grade A and 30% unrated other banks are in Grade B
We also made assumptions on interbank credit risk exposure distribution for different bank groups
and derived the distribution of unrated bank exposures on bank group level as shown in Appendix 2.
We classify corporate exposures with employee size less than 50 as SMEs. We derive the percentage
from official SNB statistics report 3Ca.17
Table 17
Percentage of SMEs
This table shows the percentage of SMEs consisted in corporate exposures for each bank group. Companies
with size less than 50 are classified as SMEs.
Bank group SME %
Large banks 76%
Cantonal banks 50%
Other banks 71%
In the current SA, the risk weight for unrated exposures is 100%. But in the BCBS 347, the
unrated exposures will be risk weighted as either 100% or 85% if they are SMEs. All other risk
weighting categories remain the same. We derive the residential mortgage portfolio distribution
and commercial mortgage portfolio mortgage distribution from UBS internal portfolio data and
17This is available at http : //www.snb.ch/en/iabout/stat/statpub/bstamon/stats/bstamon.
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assume all banks follow the same distributions as UBS. The results of this calculation are shown in
Table 18. According to our calculation, the risk weights implied by the BCBS 307 revised SA for
the different banks in Switzerland are quite similar, being clustered around 33%. The risk weights
implied by the BCBS 347 revised SA for different bank groups vary between 45% and 50%.
Table 18
Revised SA weighted average risk weights
This table shows estimates of Swiss banks risk weights for exposures to other Swiss banks.
Large Cantonal Other
banks banks banks
BCBS 307 53% 55% 49%
BCBS 347 48% 51% 46%
3.4 Off-balance sheet exposure rules
Inspection of SNB statistics indicates that all categories of Swiss banks have extended significant
volumes of undrawn loan facilities to Corporate borrowers. Large banks have also provided signif-
icant undrawn facilities to Bank counter-parties. On the basis of internal UBS data, we calculate
the impacts on Corporate and Bank exposure amounts implied by the BCBS 307 and BCBS 347
proposals for CCFs. In the latter case, the effects lead to an approximate doubling of exposures to
both Banks and Corporates. We, therefore, multiple the Corporate exposures of all banks by two
and multiple the Bank exposures of the other large bank by two. The Commodity Trading Finance
category of Specialised Lending is treated as Corporate category and is boosted by a factor of 2.6
which is derived from UBS actual portfolio data. For UBS, we use our actual estimate of the UBS
exposure inclusive of the adjustment for the new CCF rates. For the CCF adjustment under BCBS
307, we follow a similar approach. The scaling factors to boost SA exposure amount are 1.11, 1.16
and 1.2 for Corporates, Banks and CTF respectively.
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3.5 Implementing Swiss rules
Swiss banks are required to calculate minimum capital requirements based on using capital target
Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) minimum capital ratios. These are equal to
those specified in the Basel III framework plus additional percentages introduced as a so-called
Swiss Finish18. FINMA minimum capital requirements depend on the size and complexity of
banks, divided into 5 categories. Table 19 lists the criteria that determine into which category
an institution falls. The institution must meet at least three of the criteria listed to qualify for a
given category. Table 12 shows the FINMA minimum capital ratio that banks in each category are
required to employ.19
In Switzerland, as of end 2014, only four banks have been classified by FINMA as systemically
important financial institutions (SIFI) banks and allocated to category 1, and subject to higher
minimum capital requirements:20 UBS, Credit Suisse, Zurcher Kantonalbank (ZKB) and Raiffeisen.
SIFIs banks have to hold 10% of total risk weighted assets in CET1 capital (constituted by common
shares, retained earnings and other comprehensive income net of regulatory filters and deductions).
In addition to CET1 minimum capital requirements, SIFIs have to hold contingent convertible
bonds (CoCos), that convert into common equity contingent on the breach of a predetermined
ratio of CET1 over total RWA, SIFIs are required to hold a conservation buffer of 3% in form of
high trigger CoCos21, and a progressive component from 1% to 6% of low trigger CoCos.22
18See FINMA Circular 2011/2.
19These measures are expressed as ratios of minimum required capital to total risk weighted assets.
20See the Swiss TBTF bank capital regulations.
21High trigger CoCos convert to common equity when a 7% ratio of CET1 to total RWA is breached.
22Low trigger CoCos convert to common equity when a 5% ratio of CET1 to total RWA is breached.
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Table 19
Categorisation of institutions
Swiss rules on capital target ratios differentiate banks based on 5 categories. To qualify for a particular
category the scale of a banks activities as measured by at least three of four quantitative indicators must
exceed specified thresholds. This table displays the thresholds expressed in CHF millions.
Assets under Privileged Required
Total asets management deposits Equity
Category 1 ≥ 250 ≥ 1, 000 ≥ 30 ≥ 20
Category 2 ≥ 100 ≥ 500 ≥ 20 ≥ 2
Category 3 ≥ 15 ≥ 20 ≥ 0.5 ≥ 0.25
Category 4 ≥ 1 ≥ 2 ≥ 0.1 ≥ 0.05
Category 5 < 1 < 2 < 0.1 < 0.05
Table 20
CET 1 and total capital target
Swiss banks that fall into the categories listed in Table 11 are required to employ the capital target ratios
shown in this table. We employ these ratios in our calculations of the capital impact of the revised credit
risk SA for Bank and Corporate. For Commercial mortgage exposures and Residential Mortgages, we add an
additional 2% reflecting the countercyclical capital buffer adopted by the Swiss authorities for such exposures.
CET1 capital Total capital
ratio ratio
Category 1 10.0% 14%− 19%
Category 2 8.7%− 9.2% 13.6%− 14.4%
Category 3 7.8% 12.0%
Category 4 7.4% 11.2%
Category 5 7.0% 10.5%
The amount of resolution CoCos a bank must hold depends on the systematic importance of
the banks (including total exposure, market share in Switzerland and resolvability considerations).
Because of lack of data, the remaining non-SIFI banks were allocated to the FINMA categories 2 to
5 based exclusively on the total asset criterion. Using the assumptions and data described above,
one may deduce capital requirement for the ith bank for a given regulatory asset class using the
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following equation:
Ki,j =
 max(RWA
target
i,j ×RWi,j × EADi,j , LRDtargeti,j × EADi,j) , if bank i is a SIFI
RWAtargeti,j ×RWi,j × EADi,j , otherwise
Here, RWAtargeti,j is the risk weight target for the bank in question and LRD
target
i,j is the leverage
ratio target. Under Swiss regulations, the LRDtargeti,j is equal to RWA
target
i,j ×24%. In what follows,
we shall focus mainly on the impact of changes in the rules on CET1 capital although we present
results below on total regulatory capital as well.
For each SIFI bank i, we adjust the capital by a convexity adjustment ratio which is calculated as
follows:
ConvAdji =
max
(∑N
j=1RWAj ×RWAtarget,
∑N
j=1EADj × LRDtarget
)
∑N
j=1 max (RWAj ×RWAtarget, EADj × LRDtarget)
. (2)
Here, N is the number of asset classes. Such convexity adjustments are implemented in some
banks and serve to ensure that the individual exposure class capital amounts add up to total capital
once the effects on the latter of both regulatory capital and leverage ratio rules are allowed for.
Formula (3.5) may then be modified as follows
Ki,j =
 max(RWA
target
i,j ×RWi,j , LRDtargeti,j )× EADi,j × ConvAdji , if bank i is a SIFI
RWAtargeti,j ×RWi,j × EADi,j , otherwise
Up to now, we have concentrated on capital for the exposures of Swiss banks to other Swiss
banks. We employ similar approaches to deduce the effect of the revised SA on capital for other
asset classes, notably Corporate Loans, Commercial and Residential Mortgages and Specialised
Lending. We deduce the corresponding risk weights using the weights for specific risk driver ranges
appropriate to Corporate Loans, Commercial and Residential Mortgages, respectively, in Tables 2,
3 and 4. In so doing, we use risk factor distributions based on internal, confidential data supplied
by UBS.23 These distributions consist of the frequencies of loans for the different regulatory risk
23Without access to internal bank data, it would be extremely difficult to assess the impact of the revised SA as we
do in this paper. To illustrate, even to estimate the distribution of revenue for Swiss SMEs that borrow from banks is
very challenging. Summary survey data is available on the average, range and median revenues of such SMEs (CHF
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factor buckets with conditional default probability being in certain specified ranges. It is sensible
to condition on credit quality in this way because the distribution of loans across risk factors is
likely to be very different for high and low credit quality loans. Since we possess data on the default
probabilities of loans culled either directly from IRBA default probabilities or inferred from SA risk
weights, by conditioning as just described, we are able to obtain a more accurate estimate of the
capital impact.
4 Spread Impact Analysis
In this section, we describe how we investigate the spread impact, at an asset class level, for each
bank. We assume that:
∆spread = capitalnew × return on equitynew ×
RSA EAD
Current SA EAD
− capitalold× return on equityold.
(3)
Here the “capital level” is measured per Swiss franc of exposure. To estimate the return on
equity, we use the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) used in this context by Kashyap, Stein,
and Hanson (2010) and by subsequent studies such as Miles, Yang, and Marcheggiano (2012) and
Junge and Kugler (2013). This CAPM methodology allows for the possibility that the required
return on equity that a bank faces is reduced if its total capital level increases. The required return
on equity according to the CAPM equals the net premium on the equity market multiplied by
the coefficient of the banks asset return in a regression on an appropriately selected market index.
(This net premium on the equity market equals the expected return on the market index minus the
return on a short-dated Treasury security.) Thus, for asset class i belonging to bank j, the spread
million 14, 01,450 and 4, respectively) from Christen, Halter, Kammerlander, Knzi, Merki, and Zellweger (2013). But
deducing the joint distribution of revenue, leverage and credit quality without private bank data appears impossible.
UBS is active throughout Switzerland and in all of the sectors on which we focus. There may be differences between
its loan book distribution and that of other individual Swiss banks; but we would expect use of its data to give
reasonably unbiased results when one aggregates across multiple banks as we do in our results sections.
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change ∆spreadi,j is calculated as:
∆spreadi,j =

(
KRSAi,j × βSAj × RSA EADCurrent SA EAD −KSAi,j × βSAj
)
× γ , constant cost of equity(
KRSAi,j × βRSAj × RSA EADCurrent SA EAD −KSAi,j × βSAj
)
× γ , varying cost of equity
Here, K
(.)
i,j is the capital requirement per unit exposure amount expressed as:
K
(.)
i,j =
 max(RWA
target
i,j ×RW (.)i,j , LRDtargeti,j ) , if exposure i belongs to a SIFI
RWAtargeti,j ×RW (.)i,j , otherwise
RW
(.)
i,j is the average risk weight of asset class i in bank j, γ is the equity market risk premium
and is set to be 6% in our calculation.24 βj is the bank’s equity market beta, the regression
coefficient of the bank’s equity return (net of the safe rate) on a relevant (net) market index equity
return. The capital K
(.)
i,j is then adjusted in the same manner as described in equations (2) and
(3.5). We investigate the spread impact using either the CET1 capital target or the total capital
target as RWAtarget in equation (4).
Several past studies have emphasised the possibility that when a bank increases its capital levels,
its beta and hence cost of equity funding will fall. This “Modigliani-Miller effect”, while indisputably
relevant, may be of greater or lesser magnitude and, hence, should be analysed empirically.25
According to a strict version of the Modigliani-Miller theory (in which banks are viewed as simple
and transparent asset pools financed by debt and equity), the banks equity market beta should
equal:
βAsset = βEquity × Equity
Assets
+ βDebt × Debt
Assets
. (4)
For simplicity, we suppose that the bank’s debt is close to riskless so that: βDebt = 0, and subtracts
from tax effects. In this case, the bank’s equity beta will be proportional to the assets-to-equity or
24This is consistent with survey evidence from developed economies; see, for example, Fernandez, Linares, and
Acin (2014).
25Within frictionless markets, the distribution of financing between debt and equity does not affect the discount
rate a firm uses to value cash flows. See Modigliani and Miller (1958). For a bank, this implies that lending spreads
will be unaffected by holding more equity. When frictions are present such as agency costs, incomplete information
or tax differentials between debt and equity, loan spreads may be affected by changes in capital ratios.
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“leverage” ratio.
βAsset = βEquity × Equity
Assets
. (5)
The above reasoning depends on the absence of frictions such as (i) asymmetries of information
between bank insiders and the market, (ii) agency effects in the running of the bank, (iii) asymme-
tries in the tax treatment of debt and equity. In this sense, it corresponds to an idealized extreme
case. To evaluate the empirical magnitude of Modigliani-Miller effects, we allow for a more general
dependence of bank beta on leverage in that we suppose:
βEquity = α0 + α1 × Assets
Equity
. (6)
Following other authors, we estimate the parameters α0 and α1 by (i) estimating betas for a
set of banks in different time periods and then (ii) regressing these estimated betas on the leverage
level that the relevant bank had at the start of the period in question. There are several important
choices that must be made in formulating such regressions. First, one must select an appropriate
sample of banks, data frequency, equity index and window length for the beta estimation. Second,
having estimated betas, one may choose whether to estimate the relationship between betas and
leverage in a fully pooled way or whether to allow for period-specific or bank-specific parameters.
Since the regression of beta on leverage has a panel-data form, this latter choice amounts to deciding
whether or not to use fixed effects.
Figure 2 shows the log prices of the Swiss banks we covered in regression while Figure 3 shows
the Swiss market index. The share prices of the Large Banks and some of the Other Banks appear
reasonably correlated with the Swiss equity market index. The Cantonal Bank equity prices on
the other hand show little correlation and, indeed, exhibit relatively little volatility. Tables 21 and
22 present results for a range of different equations. Our sample period stretches from 1999 to
2014. The banks included in the estimations are all from Switzerland, the Eurozone or the UK
and are chosen on the basis that their assets exceed 10 billion national currency units at the end of
the sample period. In all cases, we employ weekly data to estimate the betas. This partly offsets
concerns that the equity securities of some banks in the sample might be illiquid. We repeated the
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exercises using daily data and did not obtain appreciably different results. We estimate betas using
data windows one year in length. Again, we verified that the results are not substantially different
if a six month window length is employed. The regressions for which we show results in Table 21
vary according to the group of banks analyzed: we exhibit regressions for (a) Swiss banks alone,
(b) UK banks alone, (c) Eurozone banks alone and (d) all banks. In each of these four cases, we
show results for regressions with no bank or year dummies, with year dummies alone, with banks
dummies alone, and with both year and bank dummies. Table 22 shows the same regressions but
employing a single European index while the results shown in Table 21 correspond to regressions
in which the betas for Swiss, UK and Eurozone banks are measured with respect to Swiss, UK
or Eurozone indices, respectively. In all the regressions, the right hand side variables, including
the dummies, are demeaned prior to the performing the regression. Hence, the constant in the
regression equals the unconditional mean of the left hand side variable in the regression. We will
assume, in what follows, that the premium on the equity index is 6%. Since the return on equity
equals the product of beta and the premium, we scale the left hand side variable in the regression
by 6 so that the constant may be interpreted as the average return on equity across banks implied
by the regression expressed in percent.
Figure 2. Selected Swiss banks share prices (in logs)
The figure shows the log share prices of Swiss banks from 1999 to 2015 taken from Bloomberg. Cantonal
bank share price time series (apart from that of Banque Cantonale Vaudoise) trend upwards with little
volatility suggesting relatively low liquidity. Share prices for the two large banks appear less correlated with
those of other banks.
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Figure 3. Swiss market index time series
The figure shows the Swiss stock market index from 1999 to 2015 taken from Bloomberg. The index appears
correlated with the large bank share prices exhibited in Figure 2 until late in the sample period (post 2011)
when the bank share prices under-perform the index.
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As one may observe, the average returns on equity implied by the regression constants are
low, being 4.3, 7.7, 4.9 and 5.1 percent when national indices are used to estimate betas. Typical
returns on equity employed within large European banks are closer to 10%. Inspection of betas
for individual banks suggested that there was considerable variation across banks, justifying the
use of bank specific dummies in the regression. Examination of the estimates contained in Tables
21 and 22 shows that when bank-specific fixed effects are introduced, the value of the regression
coefficient on leverage is significantly reduced. For example, in the case of Swiss banks using betas
against a Swiss national index, the leverage coefficient drops from 0.20 to 0.07 when one compares
regression 2 (which employs year dummies alone) to regression 4 (which uses both bank and year
dummies).26 It appears likely that the reduction in the size of the leverage effect that occurs when
bank dummies are introduced is a reflection of the fact that large banks tend to be more levered
and have higher correlation with equity market indices. However, one might reasonably expect
that the degree of variation in leverage for individual banks across the sample period should be
enough to identify significant leverage effects in required returns on equity if they are present in the
data. In the exercises we report below, we will use the estimates corresponding to regression 4 (i.e.,
26Backler and Wurgler (2013), like Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson (2010), find strong a relationship between the
leverage and equity market betas of US banks. When Baker and Wurgler look only at large institutions involved in
investment banking, the results weaken significantly. If returns on investment banks (which tend to be more levered)
are more correlated with market indices, then this would exaggerate the apparent relationship between leverage and
market betas. Including bank-specific dummies would remove this effect.
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including year and bank dummies). This panel data approach seems to us the most defensible given
the issues referred to in the last paragraph. The approach is also consistent with that employed
in recent studies by Miles, Yang, and Marcheggiano (2012) and Junge and Kugler (2013). We also
choose to focus on Swiss banks and to use a Swiss national index. These assumptions appear most
sensible given that our study relates to Swiss banks. One might ask why do we find weaker leverage
effects than Miles, Yang, and Marcheggiano (2012) and Junge and Kugler (2013)? The latter study
employs a log specification of regression. The theory, we would argue is more consistent with the
linear specification that we use. In preferring the linear specification, we are consistent with Miles,
Yang, and Marcheggiano (2012). When we restrict our data to UK banks and the sample period
of Miles, Yang, and Marcheggiano (2012), we obtain results similar to theirs.
Table 21
Beta regression estimates based on weekly return (National index)
The regressions are defined as follows Regression 1: OLS Regression with no bank or year dummies; Regres-
sion 2: Fixed effect with year dummy: 2014 dropped; Regression 3: Fixed effect with bank dummy: Walliser
Kantonalbank dropped for Swiss banks, Standard Chartered dropped for UK banks, Vseobecna Uverova
Banka dropped for Eurozone Banks and European banks. Regression 4: Fixed effect with bank dummy and
year dummy: 2014 dropped; Walliser Kantonalbank dropped for Swiss banks, Standard Chartered dropped
for UK banks, Vseobecna Uverova Banka dropped for Eurozone Banks and European banks.
Swiss banks UK banks
Regression 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Constant(%) 4.32 4.32 4.32 4.32 7.71 7.71 7.71 7.71
t-statistic 15.34 14.86 24.49 24.55 26.79 36.54 27.69 41.20
Leverage(%) 0.19 0.20 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.16 0.01
t-statistic 8.80 8.23 2.64 2.28 3.24 2.23 2.86 0.16
R-squared 0.38 0.42 0.79 0.82 0.12 0.62 0.22 0.72
WACC(%) 0.55 0.44 2.84 2.90 5.22 6.22 4.63 7.52
Observations 129 129 129 129 80 80 80 80
Euro zone banks European banks
Regression 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Constant(%) 4.93 4.93 4.93 4.93 5.08 5.08 5.08 5.08
t-statistic 35.85 39.92 44.05 56.63 42.53 45.42 54.70 66.74
Leverage(%) 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.05 0.04
t-statistic 8.34 9.88 1.79 2.82 11.34 12.52 2.78 2.44
R-squared 0.09 0.28 0.45 0.68 0.13 0.25 0.52 0.68
WACC(%) 2.43 2.21 4.01 3.74 2.32 2.15 4.11 4.34
Observations 680 680 680 680 889 889 889 889
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Table 22
Beta regression estimates based on weekly return (European index)
The regressions are defined as follows Regression 1: OLS Regression with no bank or year dummies; Regres-
sion 2: Fixed effect with year dummy: 2014 dropped; Regression 3: Fixed effect with bank dummy: Walliser
Kantonalbank dropped for Swiss banks, Standard Chartered dropped for UK banks, Vseobecna Uverova
Banka dropped for Eurozone Banks and European banks. Regression 4: Fixed effect with bank dummy and
year dummy: 2014 dropped; Walliser Kantonalbank dropped for Swiss banks, Standard Chartered dropped
for UK banks, Vseobecna Uverova Banka dropped for Eurozone Banks and European banks.
Swiss banks UK banks
Regression 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Constant(%) 3.55 3.55 3.55 3.55 7.54 7.54 7.54 7.54
t-statistic 13.39 12.89 23.35 24.35 23.12 33.00 23.94 37.06
Leverage(%) 0.18 0.18 0.08 0.05 0.14 0.07 0.20 0.01
t-statistic 8.81 7.98 3.11 1.86 3.24 1.92 3.22 0.17
R-squared 0.38 0.41 0.82 0.86 0.12 0.65 0.22 0.74
WACC(%) 0.00 -0.01 2.05 2.59 4.73 6.16 3.61 7.33
Observations 129 129 129 129 80 80 80 80
Euro zone banks European banks
Regression 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Constant(%) 5.57 5.57 5.57 5.57 5.44 5.44 5.44 5.44
t-statistic 36.99 40.58 45.86 56.78 42.17 44.45 54.47 64.38
Leverage(%) 0.13 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.14 0.15 0.05 0.04
t-statistic 8.51 9.95 1.41 2.44 11.09 12.08 2.59 2.36
R-squared 0.10 0.27 0.46 0.66 0.12 0.22 0.52 0.66
WACC(%) 2.77 2.53 4.78 4.41 2.52 2.35 4.47 4.65
Observations 680 680 680 680 889 889 889 889
5 Results
In this section, we report the results of our capital and spread impact calculations. We begin by
examining the effect of the switch from the current to the revised SA approach for SA banks. Table
23 presents the weighted average risk weights for different asset classes and categories of banks. The
weighted averages are worked out using weights based on each individual bank’s share of the total
exposure of the set of banks being considered. One may observe from Table 23 that the existing
weighted average risk weights for all SA banks are 19%, 66%, 92% and 39% for Bank, Corporate,
Commercial Mortgage and Residential Mortgage exposures, respectively. There is little variation
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across the categories of Cantonal and Other banks. Substituting the BCBS 307 revised SA for
the existing SA, risk weights change substantially, rising to 120% for Corporate exposures (almost
double the existing risk weight level). Bank risk weights are somewhat higher under the revised
rather than the existing SA, and, risk weights for Residential Mortgages are actually down from
39% to 37%. Risk weights for Commercial Mortgages drop from 92% to 87%.
Table 23
Current and revised RWs for SA banks
The table shows the risk weights for SA banks under the current SA rules and under the revised credit risk
SA rules set out in BCBS 307 and BCBS 347. The aggregated risk weights for each bank category are the
weighted average risk weights of individual banks within the category. Results are shown for exposures to
counter-parties in Switzerland categorised by Bank exposures, Corporate exposures, Commercial Mortgages
and Residential Mortgages.
Corp. Comm. Res. Wtd.
Bank groups Banks Financing Mortgage Mortgage Avg.
Current risk weights
Cantonal Banks 23% 66% 92% 38% 49%
Other 19% 65% 94% 39% 42%
All SA banks 19% 66% 92% 39% 45%
BCBS 307 revised SA risk weights
Cantonal Banks 33% 118% 87% 37% 54%
Other 33% 121% 87% 37% 48%
All SA banks 33% 120% 87% 37% 51%
% change between RSA and SA 73% 82% −6% −4% 12%
BCBS 347 revised SA risk weights
Cantonal Banks 24% 60% 83% 43% 52%
Other 19% 164% 83% 43% 46%
All SA banks 20% 162% 83% 43% 48%
% change between RSA and SA 3% −6% −10% 11% 7%
Substituting the BCBS 347 revised SA for the existing SA, risk weights change much less than
they do under the BCBS 307 proposals. As we mentioned in Section 2, for bank exposures and
corporate xposures, in BCBS 347, only unrated exposures are treated differently compared to the
current SA. Risk weights for Commercial Mortgages drop to 83% while Residential Mortgages
increase to 43%.
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Figure 4. Weighted average SA bank RW changes
The figure shows percentage changes in risk weights of Swiss SA banks (for selected exposure categories)
implied by a switch from the current SA to the revised credit risk SA rules in BCBS 307 and BCBS 347.
The exposure categories shown are bank exposures, corporate loans, commercial mortgages and residential
mortgages. The figure shows substantial increases in bank exposure and corporate loan risk weights and
small declines in mortgage related risk weights.
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Figure 4 shows the key results from Table 23 in graphical form. Under BCBS 307, Corporate
and Bank revised SA risk weights are respectively 82% and 73% higher than the existing SA risk
weights, while Commercial Mortgage and Residential Mortgage risk weights are 6% and 4% lower.
Under BCBS 347, Bank and Residential Mortgage risk weights are 3% and 11% higher, while
Corporate and Commercial Mortgage risk weights are 6% and 10% lower.
Table 24 shows the implied increase in capital that SA banks devote to different segments of
the Swiss loan market. Under BCBS 307, the existing CHF 4.3 billion and CHF 1.3 billion capital
that SA banks assign to Corporate and Bank lending rises to CHF 8.8 billion and CHF 2.1 billion
after the introduction of the revised SA. This is offset by a fall of around CHF 0.22 billion in the
capital that Swiss SA banks hold against Commercial and Residential Mortgage lending. Under
BCBS 347, there is almost no change in Bank capital. The capital that SA banks hold against
Corporate rises to CHF 8.2 billion, however, due to the significant increase in SA exposure amount.
The BCBS 347 effects are largely the consequence of the proposal changes in CCF rules. Table
25 shows risk weight calculations results for IRB banks under different scenarios. We present risk
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weights for the different asset classes and aggregated using exposure-weighted averages (i) under
the existing rules, (ii) assuming the revised SA is introduced, (iii) with the revised SA and with
60% exposure-level capital floors, (iv) as in (iii) but with asset-class level floors, and (v) as in (iii)
but with a bank level floor. We then repeat scenarios (iii), (iv) and (v) assuming capital floors are
imposed equal to 70% and 80% of the revised SA capital levels.
Table 24
Current capital and revised SA capital for SA banks
This table shows the weighted average capital requirements for categories (Cantonal and Other) of Swiss SA
banks under the current SA rule and the revised credit risk SA rules proposed in BCBS 307 and BCBS 347.
Figures are expressed in CHF Million.
Corp. Comm. Res.
Bank groups Banks Financing Mortgage Mortgage Sum
Current capital
Cantonal Banks 204 2,156 4,802 9,379 16,542
Other 1,061 2,169 2,845 12,582 18,603
All SA banks 1,266 4,326 7,646 21,907 35,145
BCBS 307 revised SA capital
Cantonal Banks 272 3,869 4,584 9,182 17,908
Other 1,819 4.043 2,641 11,926 20,429
All SA banks 2,091 7,912 7,226 21,109 38,337
% change between RSA and SA 65% 103% -6% -4% 12%
BCBS 347 revised SA capital
Cantonal Banks 207 3,908 4,355 10,618 19,088
Other 1,081 4,249 2,510 13,790 21,630
All SA banks 1,288 8,157 6,865 24,407 40,717
% change between RSA and SA 2% 89% -10% 11% 16%
The introduction of the revised SA makes almost no direct difference to the IRB banks. (The
only slight change evident in Corporate risk weights occurs because while predominantly applying
the IRBA rules, these banks calculate capital for a small proportion of their Corporate exposures
under SA rules.) The introduction of revised SA-capital-based floors has a very large impact,
however, on the capital of the IRB banks.
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Table 25
Weighted average risk weights for IRB banks under different scenarios
This table shows the weighted average risk weights of the three IRB banks we study, under existing rules and
under the revised SA rules of BCBS 307. We present results under different assumptions about how IRBA
risk weight floors would be linked to revised SA risk weights. Specifically, we suppose (i) that IRBA risk
weight floors are set to different percentages (60%, 70% and 80%) of revised SA risk weights and (ii) that
floors are imposed at individual exposure, asset class and overall bank level. We show results for exposures
to banks, corporate loans, commercial and residential mortgages.
BCBS 307 revised SA
Corp. Comm. Res. Spec. Wtd.
Bank groups Banks Financing Mortgage Mortgage Lending Avg.
Current risk weights 30% 43% 17% 11% 29% 19%
RSA without floor 30% 48% 17% 11% 29% 21%
RSA exposure level 60% floor 33% 78% 50% 24% 73% 43%
RSA asset class level 60% floor 30% 75% 50% 22% 72% 41%
RSA bank level 60% floor 21% 75% 50% 22% 72% 41%
RSA exposure level 70% floor 35% 88% 59% 27% 85% 49%
RSA asset class level 70% floor 30% 86% 59% 26% 85% 47%
RSA bank level 70% floor 24% 86% 59% 26% 85% 47%
RSA exposure level 80% floor 37% 98% 67% 30% 97% 55%
RSA asset class level 80% floor 31% 97% 67% 29% 97% 54%
RSA bank level 80% floor 27% 97% 67% 29% 97% 54%
BCBS 347 revised SA
Corp. Comm. Res. Spec. Wtd.
Bank groups Banks Financing Mortgage Mortgage Lending Avg.
Current risk weights 30% 43% 17% 11% 29% 19%
RSA without floor 32% 43% 17% 11% 34% 23%
RSA exposure level 60% floor 38% 61% 50% 27% 46% 40%
RSA asset class level 60% floor 35% 53% 50% 26% 44% 37%
RSA bank level 60% floor 31% 53% 50% 26% 41% 37%
RSA exposure level 70% floor 41% 67% 58% 31% 51% 45%
RSA asset class level 70% floor 38% 61% 58% 30% 49% 43%
RSA bank level 70% floor 36% 61% 58% 30% 48% 43%
RSA exposure level 80% floor 45% 73% 66% 35% 57% 50%
RSA asset class level 80% floor 42% 69% 66% 35% 55% 49%
RSA bank level 80% floor 41% 69% 66% 35% 55% 49%
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Under the BCBS 307 revised SA, the 60% floor imposed at the exposure level boosts IRB banks
Corporate, Commercial Mortgage, Residential Mortgage and Specialized Lending risk weights from
43%, 17%, 11% and 29% to 79%, 50%, 24% and 73%, respectively. When an 80% floor is imposed
at the exposure level, the risk weights for these four asset classes rise to 98%, 67%, 30% and 97%.
These increases exceed factors of 2, 4, 2 and 3. Weighted average risk weights (across all IRB banks
and the five asset classes we consider) go from 19% to 55%, a factor exceeding 2.
Under BCBS 347 revised SA, the 60% floor imposed at the exposure level boosts IRB banks
Bank, Corporate, Commercial Mortgage , Residential Mortgage and Specialized Lending risk
weights from 30%, 43%, 17%, 11% and 29% to 38%, 61%, 50% , 27% and 46%, respectively.
When an 80% floor is imposed at the exposure level, the risk weights for these four asset classes
rise to 45%, 73%, 66%, 35% and 57%. Weighted average risk weights go from 19% to 50%, a factor
exceeding 2.
Figure 5. IRB bank RW changes with 80% asset class level floor
The figure shows percentage changes in weighted average IRBA bank risk weights for four exposure cate-
gories: Bank Exposures, Corporate Loans and Commercial and Residential Mortgages. The calculations are
performed assuming an asset class level floor equal to 80% of the revised credit risk SA risk weights. All
except bank exposure risk weights are substantially increased by the introduction of the revised credit SA
risk weight floor.
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Note that an exposure level floor is more conservative in its impact on capital than an asset class
level floor which, in turn, is more conservative than a bank level floor. This intuitive finding results
from the fact that there may be offsets when the floor is applied at a more aggregate level. However,
imposing capital floors at the three different levels leads to broadly similar results in practice.
Figure 5 shows the overall risk weight impact by asset class with 80% asset class level floors. Under
BCBS 307, risk weights rise by 5% for Bank exposures, 127% for Corporate exposures, 301% for
Commercial Mortgages, 157% for Residential Mortgages and 233% for Specialized Lending. While
under BCBS 347, risk weights rise by 40%, 63%, 296%, 201% and 89% for Banks, Corporates,
Commercial Mortgages, Residential Mortgages and Specialized Lending respectively.
Table 27
Current and revised SA capital (with 80% asset class level floor) for all banks
The table shows current capital (broken down by asset class) for all banks and the capital implied by the
revised credit risk SA and an 80% asset level floor for IRB banks. Under BCBS 307, total capital for
Bank Exposure, Corporate Loans, Commercial and Residential Mortgages rises by 59%, 134%, 17% and 4%,
respectively. Capital requirement figures are expressed in CHF million. While under BCBS 347, the figures
are 38%, 142%, 13%, 21% and 130%.
Cml. Res. Specialized
Bank groups Banks Corporates Mortgage Mortgage Lending Total
Current capital 1,538 5,998 8,559 27,002 1,337 44,433
BCBS 307 revised SA
Revised SA capital 2,451 14,032 10,054 28,090 4,897 59,523
Change in capital 59% 134% 17% 4% 266% 34%
BCBS 347 revised SA
Revised SA capital 2,128 14,498 9.662 32,581 3,069 61,938
Change in capital 38% 142% 13% 21% 130% 39%
Table 26 shows the impact on the capital of the IRB banks of the various scenarios so far
considered. Overall (based on total capital across IRB banks and the five Swiss loan asset classes
we consider), under BCBS 307, capital is 119% higher than current levels, if an asset class level
80% floor is introduced. The increases for Corporate and Commercial Mortgage exposures are
214% and 210%, while capital held against Residential Mortgages rise by just 37%. In monetary
44
terms, the capital that the three IRB banks hold against their Swiss lending rises from CHF 9.29
billion to CHF 20.32 billion, in this case. Under BCBS 347, the total capital is 128% higher than
current levels, if an asset class level 80% floor is applied. Capital held against Bank, Corporate,
Commercial and Residential Mortgage exposures are 208%, 279%, 207% and 60% higher than the
current levels.
Figure 6. Change in capital for all banks (with 80% asset class level floor)
The figure shows the percentage change in the total capital of Swiss banks, broken down by asset class, when
the current rules are replaced with the revised credit risk SA and 80% asset-class level floors.
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Table 27 shows the impact on the total capital that all banks hold against different asset
classes. If an asset-class-level 80% floor is introduced for IRB banks, under BCBS 307, the increases
in capital for exposures to Banks, Corporates and Specialized Lending are 59%, 134% and 266%.
Capital held against Commercial Mortgages and Residential Mortgages rises by just 17% and 4%, in
the same case. Under BCBS 347, the increase in capital held against Bank, Corporate, Commercial
Mortgage, Residential Mortgage and Specialised Lending exposures are 38%, 142%, 13%, 21% and
130% respectively.
We now turn to the spread implications of the Basel Committees proposed BCBS 306, 307 and
347 capital rule changes. We calculate the spread impact using equations (4) and (4) in Section 4.
We multiply post-rule change risk weights by the relevant capital target to obtain the per-Swiss-
franc capital level under the new rules. We adjust for the leverage ratio target if the bank is a SIFI
45
as in equation (4) and impose the relevant floor if this is included in the scenario we are examining.
We multiply the resulting per Swiss-franc capital by the required equity return. We subtract off the
pre-rule-change capital multiplied by a pre-rule-change required return on equity. Table 28 shows
the resulting weighted average (across individual banks) spread impacts for SA banks, specifically
for Cantonal and Other banks. We report spread impacts assuming that the capital rule changes
reduce leverage and hence lead to a reduction in the cost of equity. The calculation of the reduction
in cost of equity employs the Swiss bank regression 4 results (with both bank and year dummies)
from Table 21.
Table 28
Spread impact in basis points for SA banks
The table shows the impact on the spreads charged by Swiss SA banks of replacing current rules with
the revised credit risk SA. Units are basis points. The upper panel shows results when the capital impact
is based on CET1 capital targets alone, while the lower panel shows results when the capital change is
based on the Total Capital target ratio. The spread impacts are calculated assuming equity returns that
adjust endogenously as total bank capital levels change. Spreads on commercial and residential mortgages
fall slightly while those on corporate loans increase by 44 and 67 basis points (depending on the capital
target ratio employed) when the BCBS 307 revised credit risk SA is introduced. Under BCBS 347, the
spread impact on Corporate is similar to the figure from BCBS 307, but the spread impact on Residential
Mortgages increases by 4 and 5 base points rather than decreasing when BCBS 307 is applied.
Cmt. Res. Wtd. Cmt. Res. Wtd.
Banks Corp. Mtg. Mtg. Avg. Banks Corp. Mtg. Mtg. Avg.
CET1 capital target
Cant. Banks 6 41 -3 -1 4 0.1 33 -7 4 5
Other 8 47 -7 -2 4 0.0 42 -11 4 6
All SA banks 8 44 -5 -1 4 0.0 38 -9 4 6
Total capital target
Cant. Banks 8 60 -5 -1 6 0.1 49 -10 5 8
Other 13 72 -10 -3 6 0.1 64 -16 5 9
All SA banks 12 67 -7 -2 6 0.1 57 -12 5 9
The SA bank spread impacts shown in Table 28 are sizeable for exposures to Corporates under
both BCBS 307 and BCBS 347. Under BCBS 347, the spread for Corporates rises by 38 basis points
for all SA banks when a CET1 capital target is employed and by 57 basis points when a total capital
target is used. SA bank spreads for Commercial Mortgages drop by 12 basis points with a CET1
46
target ratio when a total capital target ratio is employed under BCBS 347. Table 29 shows the
spread impact of introducing the revised SA and an asset class level floor for weighted averages of
IRB banks and IRB and SA banks combined for the different asset classes under assumptions of (i)
CET1 and (ii) total capital target ratios and a reduced cost of equity through a Modigliani-Miller
effect. Assuming (ii) rather than (i) boosts the impact substantially, as one might expect.
When the BCBS 307 rules are applied, applying a CET1 target ratio, one finds that IRB
and SA banks Corporate spreads are 58 basis points higher with the 80% revised SA floor, while
Commercial Mortgage, Residential Mortgage and Specialised Lending spreads are 14, 2 and 71 basis
points higher. When the total capital target ratio is applied, the spread increases are 93, 23, 3 and
122 basis points. The weighted average across asset classes of spread impacts is 13 basis points for
the CET1 target ratio and 21 basis points for the total capital target ratio.
When the BCBS 347 rules are applied, applying a CET1 target ratio, Bank, Corporate, Com-
mercial Mortgages, Residential Mortgages and Specialised Lending spreads are 7, 63, 11, 7 and 41
basis points higher with the 80% revised SA floor. When the total capital target ratio is applied,
the spread increases are 12, 103, 18, 11 and 71 basis points. The weighted average across asset
classes of spread impacts is 15 basis points for the CET1 target ratio and 24 basis points for the
total capital target ratio. Figures 7 and 8 show the spread effects graphically.
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Figure 7. Spread impact (in bps) for all banks (asset class level floor, CET1 target)
The figure shows spread impacts (in basis points and allowing for endogenous cost of equity) for all banks.
The spread impacts are weighted by banks relative exposure volumes and assume the revised credit risk SA
is introduced with asset-class-level 80% IRBA risk weight floor and that the capital impact is based on the
CET1 ratio.
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Figure 8. Spread impact (bps) across all banks (asset class level floor and total capital
target)
The figure shows spread impacts (in basis points and allowing for endogenous cost of equity) for all banks.
The spread impacts are weighted by banks relative exposure volumes and assume the revised credit risk SA
is introduced with asset-class-level 80% IRBA risk weight floor and that the capital impact is based on the
Total Capital.
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Our results may be compared to those of recent studies that have examined the impact of
capital rules changes on spreads in Swiss loan markets. Basten and Koch (2014) use panel data
on mortgage offers to examine whether Swiss banks raised mortgage lending rates because of the
introduction of the Counter-Cyclical Buffer increase in capital target rates. (In February 2013, the
Swiss authorities activated a Counter Cyclical Buffer requiring banks to increase CET1 capital by
an amount equal to 1% of their risk-weighted domestic Residential Mortgages by September 2013.)
Basten and Koch find that, following the change, banks charged on average 17 to 18 basis points
more while insurers charged on average 26 to 28 basis points more. The later finding suggests that
banks are the marginal price setters and that insurers took the opportunity created by pressure
on bank capital to raise their lending spreads significantly. Table 30 contains annual flow costs of
lending and discounted sums of future costs. One may observe that the costs are between CHF
1.0 billion and CHF 2.5 billion if BCBS 307 rules are applied and the costs are between CHF 1.3
billion and CHF 3.2 billion if BCBS 347 rules are applied. Assuming a discount rate of 3%, we
present estimates of the present discounted sum of future costs in Table 31. Overall, the present
discounted cost of the rule changes is between CHF 46 billion and CHF 115 billion under BCBS
307, while the cost is between CHF 43 billion and CHF 106 billion under BCBS 347.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the impacts on the Swiss loan market of the capital rule changes proposed in
BCBS 306, 307 and 347. The rule changes include
a) the substitution of a risk-indicator-based, revised SA for the current SA (especially in the
case of BCBS 307),
b) changes in the treatment of undrawn loan facilities (particularly important in the case of
BCBS 347)
c) the imposition of capital floors for IRB capital based on a percentage of revised SA capital.
We study the effects of these changes on the risk weights and capital levels of 37 Swiss banks
and banking groups including three IRB banks. We then examine how the capital changes are
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likely to affect the lending rates of these banks in different segments of the Swiss loan market,
specifically lending to (i) other Swiss banks, (ii) Corporates (iii) Commercial Mortgage borrowers
and (iv) Residential Mortgage borrowers. If implemented in Switzerland, we estimate that the
proposed changes in capital rules contained in BCBS 347 would increase capital for IRB banks for
Bank, Corporate, Commercial and Residential Mortgage and Specialised Lending by 208%, 279%,
207%, 60% and 109%.
Assuming full “pass through” to borrowers, a weighted average of lending rates on Corporate
loans for all IRB and SA banks would rise by between 63 and 103 basis points.An incomplete 50%
pass through would lead to rises in lending rates of between 26 and 52 basis points.27
We calculate monetary impacts of the spread changes on the Swiss economy by multiplying
weighted averages (across banks) of the spread changes with the volumes of outstanding loans and
an assumed pass through parameter of 100%.28 The resulting estimates suggest that the annual
cost of the policy change would be between CHF 1.9 billion and CHF 3.0 billion while the total
present discounted cost would be between CHF 62.7 billion and CHF 101.4 billion (assuming a 3
27We do not try to infer a pass through fraction for spreads changes consequent on changes in capital rules since (i)
inferring such a pass through percentage is difficult and arbitrary and (ii) even if not passed through, spread changes
impose costs on bank shareholders. Illustrating the difficulty of inferring pass through percentages, Cecchin (2011)
looks at the pass though of bank funding costs (due to changes in market interest rates) to floating and fixed rate
Swiss mortgage lending rates. The results are complex suggesting different degrees of competition in the fixed and
floating rate segments of the market and consequent upward and downward inflexibility.
28We think it appropriate to perform these calculations assuming a 100% pass through as this gives a measure of
the total cost on both borrowers and bank shareholders.
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7 Appendix
This section describes how we estimate the distribution of risk drivers for exposures to banks.
7.1 Assumptions
• We classify the Swiss banks into 3 groups: Large Banks, Cantonal Banks and Other Banks.
For each bank group, we assume the credit exposures to the three bank groups are distributed
as Table 32. Large banks’ exposure is partially data driven and the rest is expert based.
• Table 34 shows the risk drivers (Net NPA (NNPA) ratios and CET1 ratios) for 48 Swiss
banks. The risk drivers represented here are proxies rather than exact figures. These do not
exactly match either the definition of CET1, or the definition of Net NPA ratio, as defined
in the revisedSA approach.The following assumptions are made to derive the required ratios:
1. Basel II Tier One Regulatory Capital ratio as proxy for CET1
2. Modified definition of NNPA ratio, namely (Non-Performing Loans - Loan Loss Re-
serve)/(Total Earning Assets - Total Securities)
3. Risk driver values taken from the 2013 End of year Financial statements
Table 32
Interbank credit risk exposure distribution for different bank groups
This table shows the assumptions we make regarding the exposure shares that each individual bank (within
one of the three groups of banks) has with respect to other Swiss banks in the three different categories we
consider. Hence, we suppose that, for each of the two large Swiss banks, 30% of its reported exposure to
Swiss banks is with respect to the other large bank and 30% is with respect to cantonal banks. The assumed
percentages were provided to us by a banker closely familiar with the Swiss interbank market and are based
on the judgments of that individual.
Large Cantonal Other
banks Banks banks
Large Banks 30% 30% 40%
Cantonal Banks 40% 30% 30%
Other banks 50% 30% 20%
Each row represents the credit risk exposure distribution for that bank group. The number of
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banks in each bank group is given in Table 33.
Table 33
Numbers of banks by group
The Table shows the numbers of banks in each of the three categories we study, Large, Cantonal and Other
Banks.
Large Cantonal Other
banks Banks banks
Count 2 14 32
59
Table 34
NNPA and CET1 ratios
The table shows the classification of a set of Swiss banks according to Net Non-Performing Asset and CET1
ratios and according to whether they are Large Banks, Cantonal Banks or Other Banks.
Classification with respect Classification with respect
Bank names Bank group to Net NPA proxy to CET1 proxy
Caisse d’Epargne d’Aubonne Large banks Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Credit Suisse Large banks Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
UBS Large banks Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Reiffeisen Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Banca dello Stato del Cantone Ticino Cantonal banks 1% < Net NPA ≤ 3% 12% ≤ CET1
Banque Cantonale du Jura Cantonal banks 1% < Net NPA ≤ 3% 12% ≤ CET1
Banque Cantonale Vaudoise Cantonal banks Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Basellandschaftliche Kantonalbank Cantonal banks 1% < Net NPA ≤ 3% 12% ≤ CET1
Basler Kantonalbank Cantonal banks Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Berner Kantonalbank Cantonal banks Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Luzerner Kantonalbank Cantonal banks 1% < Net NPA ≤ 3% 12% ≤ CET1
Schaffauser Kantonalbank Cantonal banks Net NPA > 3% 12% ≤ CET1
St. Galler Kantonalbank Cantonal banks 1% < Net NPA ≤ 3% 12% ≤ CET1
Thurgauer Kantonalbank Cantonal banks Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Walliser Kantonalbank Cantonal banks 1% < Net NPA ≤ 3% 12% ≤ CET1
Zuger Kantonalbank Cantonal banks Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Zurcher Kantonalbank Cantonal banks Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Bank J. Safra Sarasin Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Bank Linth Other 1% < Net NPA ≤ 3% 12% ≤ CET1
Clientis Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Coop Bank Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Julius Baer Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Migros Bank Other 1% < Net NPA ≤ 3% 7% ≤ CET1 < 9.5%
Neue Aargauer Bank Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Bank CIC (Schweiz) AG Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Bernerland Bank Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Leumi Private Bank Ltd Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
BSI SA Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Coutts & Co Ltd Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
EFG International Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Freie Gemeinschaftsbank BCL Other Net NPA > 3% 9.5% ≤ CET1 < 12%
Bank Hapoalim (Switzerland) Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Privatbank IHAG Zurich Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Maerki Baumann & Co. AG Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Notenstein Private Bank Ltd Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Bank Morgan Stanley AG Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Valartis Group AG Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
BNP Paribas (Suisse) SA Other 1% < Net NPA ≤ 3% 7% ≤ CET1 < 9.5%
Piguet Galland & Cie SA Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Pand Privatbank AG Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Regiobank Solothurn Other 1% < Net NPA ≤ 3% 12% ≤ CET1
Baloise Bank SoBa Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 9.5% ≤ CET1 < 12%
Swissquote Group Holding Ltd. Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Acrevis Bank AG Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Union Bancaire Privee Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Banca Zarattini & Co SA Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
Vontobel Group Other Net NPA ≤ 1% 12% ≤ CET1
7.2 Estimate distributions
Given the interbank credit exposure distribution (Table 32) for each bank group and the risk
drivers (Table 34), we can estimate the risk driver distributions for each bank group in a simplified
approach. The estimation steps are given as following:
• Step 1: We classify each bank into the three bank groups.
• Step 2: For each bank, determine which CET1 and NNPA bucket it belongs to given its
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CET1 ratio and NNPA ratio.
• Step 3: For g = 1 : 3 (for each bank group), for j = 1 : 3 (for each bank group) and for
i = 1 : 48 (for each bank) Calculate the ith bank’s weight as wi = wg,j/Nj if bank i belongs
to bank group j, where wg,j ,?is the total weight of bank group j as shown in row g in Table
32, Nj is the total number of banks in group j.
• Step 4: Calculate the probability for CET1 and NNPA bucket k as: pk =
∑N
i=1wi, where
wi = wg,j/Nj if bank i belongs to CET1 and NNPA bucket k, otherwise wi = 0. End
The estimated distribution is given in Table 35.
Table 35
Generated joint distribution of CET1 and NNPA
The table shows for individual banks in each of our three categories of banks the distributions (by Net Non-
Performing Asset (NNPA) and Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratios) of that bank’s exposures to other
Swiss banks in the three categories.
12% > 9.5% > 7% > 5.5% >
CET1 ratio CET1 ratio CET1 ratio CET1 ratio CET1 ratio CET1 ratio
≥ 12% ≥ 9.5% ≥ 7% ≥ 5.5% ≥ 4.5% ≥ 4.5%
Large banks
NNPA ratio ≤ 1% 79.64% 1.25% 1.25% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1% < NNPA ratio ≤ 3% 13.21% 1.25% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
NNPA ratio > 3% 2.14% 1.25% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Cantonal banks
NNPA ratio ≤ 1% 81.52% 0.94% 0.94% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1% < NNPA ratio ≤ 3% 12.59% 0.94% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
NNPA ratio > 3% 2.14% 0.94% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Other banks
NNPA ratio ≤ 1% 83.39% 0.63% 0.63% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1% < NNPA ratio ≤ 3% 11.96% 0.63% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
NNPA ratio > 3% 2.14% 0.63% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
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Figure 9. Generated joint distribution of CET1 and NNPA
The figure shows graphically the distributions contained in Table 35.
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7.3 Distribution of unrated bank exposure
Table 36
Interbank credit risk exposure distribution for different bank groups
The table shows the interbank credit risk exposure distribution for different bank groups.
Large Cantonal Other
banks Banks banks
Large banks 0.3 0.4 0.3
Cantonal banks 0.3 0.3 0.3
Other banks 0.5 0.15 0.35
Based on the above assumptions we van estimate the distributions of unrated bank exposures as
shown in Table 37.
Table 37
Distribution of unrated bank exposures
The table shows the distribution of unrated bank exposures.
Total
Grade A Grade B Grade C unrated
Large banks 30.5% 4.5% 0.0% 35.0%
Cantonal banks 25.5% 4.5% 0.0% 30.0%
Other banks 19.8% 5.3% 0.0% 25.0%
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Part III
Maximum Diversification Strategies Along
Commodity Risk Factors
Simone Bernardi, Markus Leippold, and Harald Lohre
Abstract
Pursuing risk-based allocation across a universe of commodity assets, we find diversified risk parity
(DRP) strategies to provide convincing results. DRP strives for maximum diversification along un-
correlated risk sources. A straightforward way to derive uncorrelated risk sources relies on principal
components analysis (PCA). While the ensuing statistical factors can be associated with commod-
ity sector bets, the corresponding DRP strategy entails excessive turnover because of the instability
of the PCA factors. We suggest an alternative implementation of a DRP strategy that builds on a
more stable anchor and implicitly allows for a uniform exposure to commodity risk premia.
Keywords: Commodity Strategies, Risk-Based Portfolio Construction, Risk Parity, Diversification
JEL Classification: G11; D81
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1 Introduction
Commodity investing is often suggested for diversifying traditional stock-bond portfolios — for
example, there is empirical evidence of negative correlation between stocks and commodities during
stock market downturns, which makes commodities a perfect hedging instrument, see Bodie and
Rosansky (2000). However, while there is plenty of evidence that adding commodities to an existing
stock-bond portfolio can enhance its risk-return profile, there is less research on the diversification
potential inherent within the universe of commodity assets.1
From a pure return perspective, Erb and Harvey (2006) document that the average annual
excess return of individual commodity futures has historically been approximately zero. Hence,
static long-only investments in commodities may not be necessarily profitable. In addition, the
inherent heterogeneity within this asset class, paired with high volatility and excess kurtosis, very
often offsets any positive average return. On the other side, the same authors document abnormal
returns for specific combinations of commodities, which exhibit a forward curve with attractive
term structure characteristics. To derive profitable commodity trading strategies, one should thus
resort to momentum or commodity-term structure signals, see Fuertes, Miffre, and Rallis (2010).
Recently, Fuertes, Fernandez-Perez, and Miffre (2016) document abnormal returns when trading
long low-idiosyncratic volatility positions versus the high ones, thus evidencing an inverse risk-
return relationship as prevailing in equities.2
We contribute to the literature by devising optimally diversified commodity portfolios along
these commodity risk factors. As evidenced by Erb and Harvey (2006), diversification is key
in generating performance in commodities. The standard approach to exploiting diversification
benefits is to follow the classic mean-variance approach of Markowitz (1952) to optimally trade-off
assets risk and return. Yet, despite the heterogeneity of commodity markets and the low pair-wise
correlations across different commodity sectors, the ensuing portfolio construction will most likely
be confounded by the estimation risk, especially the one for estimating expected returns. More
recently, in pursuit of better diversified portfolios, alternative risk-based allocation techniques have
1See among others Kat and Oomen (2007) for an overview. Also, see Miffre (2016) for a recent survey for the
literature on long-short commodity investing.
2See also Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006).
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become popular. Qian (2006, 2011) and Maillard, Roncalli, and Teiletche (2010) advocate the risk
parity approach that allocates capital such that all assets contribute equally to portfolio risk.
The common rationale of all the above approaches is diversification. Still, diversification is a
rather elusive concept, which is hardly made explicit in portfolio optimization studies. A notable
exception, however, is Meucci (2009). Striving for diversification, he pursues principal component
analysis (PCA) to extract uncorrelated risk sources inherent in the underlying assets. The resulting
eigenvectors represent linear combinations of the underlying assets and are thus commonly referred
to as principal portfolios.3 For a portfolio to be well-diversified, its overall risk should be evenly
distributed across these principal portfolios.
Recently, Lohre, Opfer, and Orsza´g (2014) have adopted the framework of Meucci (2009) to
determine maximum diversification portfolios in a multi-asset allocation study. Their strategy
coincides with a risk parity strategy that allocates risk by principal portfolios rather than by
the underlying assets. The authors demonstrate this diversified risk parity (DRP) strategy to
provide convincing risk-adjusted performance, together with superior diversification properties,
when benchmarked against other competing risk-based investment strategies. We explore a different
route. In particular, we seek to exploit the diversification potential inherent in the commodity
market by investing in two distinct uncorrelated decompositions of it: the principal portfolios
(PPs) arising out of the PCA and minimum torsions (MTs) derived from the minimum rotation of
a given commodity factor model. In an empirical study we benchmark these strategies against a
set of well known diversification strategies under long-only constraints.
We find that a long-only DRP strategy that diversifies along the most relevant principal portfo-
lios of the Standard and Poor’s Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) universe indeed delivers
superior risk-adjusted performance in a 30-year backtest. The DRP strategy differs from the pre-
vailing risk-based allocation schemes like 1/N , minimum-variance, or traditional risk parity, since it
is characterized by concentrated allocations that are altered actively whenever a significant change
in risk structure calls for adjusting the risk exposure. As a result, when budgeting risk along prin-
cipal portfolios the strategy entails a significant amount of turnover potentially eroding its added
3Partovi and Caputo (2004) have coined the term principal portfolios when recasting the efficient frontier in terms
of these principal portfolios.
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value in terms of return. Obviously, the amount of turnover is related to the instability of the
principal portfolios. Moreover, PCA factors often lack a sound economic interpretation, which is
complicating the decision to buy or sell a given principal portfolio. Risk-wise, one is indifferent to
buying or selling a given principal portfolio.
To alleviate the above issues, we build on Meucci, Santangelo, and Deguest (2014) to come up
with a more meaningful set of orthogonal factors. In particular, we consider an orthogonalized
version of well known commodity risk factors. These factors are chosen in such a manner that they
have minimum tracking error with regard to the original ones. Therefore, these orthogonalized
factors are labeled minimum risk factor torsions. In this way, the risk model guiding the DRP
strategy is anchored in more robust risk factors that implicitly determine the direction of trade.
We document the associated DRP strategy to provide a comparable risk-return profile as the PCA
version, but at a considerably lower turnover.
In addition, analyzing the risk structure of the competing alternatives, we find that the tra-
ditional risk parity strategy is similar to the 1/N strategy or the market indices in having a con-
centrated risk exposure. When it comes to diversification of weights, minimum-variance strategies
typically prove to be rather concentrated in low-volatility assets. In the equity domain, this ob-
servation resonates with the finding of Scherer (2011) that minimum-variance strategies implicitly
capture risk-based pricing anomalies inherent in the cross-section of stock returns, especially the
low-volatility and low-beta anomalies. In this vein, a commodity factor model accounting for
common risk factors is a prerequisite for explaining a given strategy’s return. Moreover, we demon-
strate that the performance of diversified risk parity strategies is derived from a uniform exposure
to various risk factors.
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology of the risk-based
asset allocation techniques. In Section 3, we foster intuition of the principal portfolios relative
to the minimum risk factor torsions. Section 4 studies the empirical implementation of long-only
risk-based strategies in the classic commodities universe. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Managing Diversification
While there are many different ways to achieve diversification, we focus on two approaches, diver-
sifying by principal portfolios and diversifying by minimum risk factor torsions. Below, we present
their theoretical underpinnings and we introduce the benchmarking strategies that we use later in
our empirical study.
2.1 Diversifying by principal portfolios
We consider a portfolio comprising N commodities with weight and return vectors w and R, provid-
ing a portfolio return of Rw = w
′R. At the heart of diversification is the search for low-correlated
assets. Although commodities are a heterogeneous asset class, the corresponding correlation figures
will hardly be zero. Still, it is possible to construct uncorrelated assets from a given covariance
matrix. Along these lines, Meucci (2009) extracts uncorrelated risk sources by applying a principal
component analysis (PCA) to the covariance matrix Σ of the portfolio assets, i.e.,
Σ = EΛE′, (1)
where Λ = diag(λ1, ..., λN ) is a diagonal matrix comprising Σ’s eigenvalues that are assembled in
descending order, λ1 ≥ ... ≥ λN . The columns of matrix E represent the eigenvectors of Σ that
define a set of N uncorrelated principal portfolios with variance λi for i = 1, ..., N and returns
R˜ = E
′
R. Hence, we can think of a given portfolio either in terms of its weights w in the original
assets or in terms of its weights w˜ = E
′
w in the principal portfolios. Because principal portfolios
are uncorrelated by design, the total portfolio variance is derived by simply computing a weighted
average over their corresponding variances λi using weights w˜
2
i :
V ar(Rw) =
N∑
i=1
w˜2i λi. (2)
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Normalizing the principal portfolios’ contributions by the portfolio variance then yields the diver-
sification distribution:
pi =
w˜2i λi
V ar(Rw)
, i = 1, ..., N. (3)
Note that the diversification distribution is always positive, and that all pi sum up to one.
Building on the above concept, Meucci (2009) conceives a portfolio to be well diversified when
the principal portfolios contributions pi are “approximately equal and the diversification distribu-
tion is close to uniform.” Conversely, portfolios mainly loading on a single PP display a peaked
diversification distribution. To aggregate the diversification distribution, Meucci (2009) chooses
the exponential of its entropy for evaluating a portfolios degree of diversification:
NEnt = exp
(
−
N∑
i=1
pi ln pi
)
. (4)
Intuitively, we can interpret NEnt as the number of uncorrelated bets. For instance, a completely
concentrated portfolio is characterized by pi = 1 for one i and pj = 0 for i 6= j resulting in an
entropy of 0, which implies NEnt = 1. Conversely, NEnt = N is obtained for a portfolio that is
completely homogenous in terms of uncorrelated risk sources. In this case, pi = pj = 1/N holds for
all i, j, implying an entropy equal to ln(N) and NEnt = N .
Lohre, Opfer, and Orsza´g (2014) implement the above-mentioned definition of a well-diversified
portfolio by constructing an allocation strategy, which allocates equal risk budgets to every uncor-
related principal portfolio. We obtain the weights wPPDRP of this strategy by solving
wPPDRP = argmax
w∈C
NEnt(w), (5)
where the weights w may possibly be restricted according to a set of constraints C. Obviously,
an inverse volatility strategy along the PPs is a feasible, but not unique, solution of (5). In fact,
buying or selling a certain amount of a given principal portfolio gives rise to the same ex ante risk
exposure. For K principal portfolios, there exist 2K solutions, all of which are inverse volatility
strategies reflecting all possible variations of long and short principal portfolios. Typically, most of
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these portfolios tend to be difficult to implement in practice because of rather infeasible portfolio
weights. For the traditional risk parity strategy, Maillard, Roncalli, and Teiletche (2010) show that
imposing positive asset weights guarantees a unique solution. Unfortunately, the positivity of asset
weights is not a sufficient condition to determine a unique DRP strategy.
In that regard, Bruder and Roncalli (2012) and Roncalli and Weisang (2012) investigate general
risk budgeting strategies and demonstrate that uniqueness is obtained when imposing constraints to
the underlying risk factors. In our case, this requirement translates into imposing sign constraints
to the principal portfolios. In doing so, we express a view with respect to the risk premium of each
principal portfolio. While one could resort to elaborate forecasting techniques to derive these views,
we pursue a more pragmatic approach. We equalize the desired sign of the principal portfolios with
the sign of its corresponding historical risk premium. Thus, we intend to design a strategy that
is geared towards exploiting long-term risk premia. The respective historical risk premia result
from multiplying the current principal portfolios’ weights with historical asset returns using an
expanding time window.
2.2 Diversifying by minimum torsions
A principal component analysis provides just one possible orthogonal decomposition of the covari-
ance matrix Σ. While the principal portfolios are designed to capture most of the assets’ variations,
they are often perceived as being ad-hoc statistical factors that lack an economic interpretation and
are rather unstable over time. Addressing these objections, Meucci, Santangelo, and Deguest (2014)
suggest resorting to a factor model that can be orthogonalized in a way that ensures a minimum
tracking error to the original factors. The authors start from a K-factor model F = (Fk)
K
k=1 to
explain asset returns and propose a methodology to change the standard representation of portfolio
returns Rw,
Rw = w
′R = b′F, (6)
into a representation in terms of uncorrelated factors FT , i.e.,
Rw = b
′F = b′TFT , (7)
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where b and bT denote the loadings of the portfolio returns with respect to the factor model F and
FT , respectively. Following Section 2.1 and using R = B
′F, where B ∈ RK×N , we can decompose
the covariance matrix Σ as follows:
Σ = B′ΣFB + u, (8)
where u captures assets’ idiosyncratic risk that cannot be explained by the chosen factor structure.
The next step is to construct an orthogonal decomposition of F by means of a linear transformation
FT = tF where t is a suitable K ×K rotation, or torsion, matrix.
The contribution of Meucci, Santangelo, and Deguest (2014) is to define a systematic way of
constructing uncorrelated factor model representations by looking at the set of uncorrelated risk
sources, which closely mimics the original factor model F. In particular, the authors compute the
uncorrelated factor model that represents the minimum torsion linear transformation of the original
factor model.4 As a consequence, the orthogonalized factors keep the original factor interpretation
as close as possible. Among all linear transformations t, which ensure factors to be uncorrelated,
they select the minimum torsion tMT that minimizes the distance to the original factors,
tMT = argmin
Corr(tF)=IK×K
√√√√ 1
K
K∑
k=1
V ar
(
t′Fk − Fk
σFk
)
, (9)
where σFk denotes the volatility of the factor Fk. Under this minimum torsion tMT , the systematic
risk of a given portfolio can be decomposed as follows:
B′ΣFB = B′t
−1
MTΣMT t
′−1
MTB, (10)
where ΣMT = diag(σ
2
MT,1, ..., σ
2
MT,K) is a diagonal matrix comprising minimum risk factor torsion
variances. Analogous to the PCA decomposition, we can write the portfolio in terms of physical
weights w in the original assets, or in terms of torsion weights wMT in the minimum torsion risk
factors FMT = tMTF. It holds that wMT = t
′−1
MTBw and the minimum risk factor torsions have
returns RMT = t
′−1
MTBR. Again, the total portfolio variance can simply be computed as a weighted
4See http://symmys.com/node/599 for the corresponding Matlab code.
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average over the uncorrelated factors variances σ2MT,k using minimum risk factor torsion weights
wMT,k:
V ar(Rw) =
K∑
k=1
w2MT,kσ
2
MT,k. (11)
The diversification distribution (3) and the number of uncorrelated bets in (4) follow using
pMT,k =
w2MT,kσ
2
MT,k
V ar(Rw)
, k = 1, ...,K. (12)
Analogous to optimization (5), we obtain the weights wMTDRP by maximizing the corresponding
entropy measure
wMTDRP = argmax
w∈C
exp
(
−
K∑
k=1
pMT,k ln pMT,k
)
. (13)
In contrast to the diversified risk parity strategy (based on principal portfolios), the diversified risk
parity strategy along minimum risk factor torsions naturally entertains a view on the sign of risk
factors, which is consistent with the underlying economic factor model. Hence, one does not need
to impose further restrictions to render the optimal strategy unique.
2.3 Benchmark strategies
For benchmarking the diversified and principal risk parity strategy, we consider four alternative
risk-based asset allocation strategies: 1/N , minimum-variance, risk parity, and the most diversified
portfolio of Choueifaty and Coignard (2008). First, we implement the 1/N strategy that monthly
rebalances to an equally weighted allocation scheme. Hence, the portfolio weights w1/N are simply:
w1/N =
1
N
. (14)
Second, we compute the minimum-variance (MV) portfolio by building on an expanding time
window, starting from 36 monthly observations, for the covariance-matrix estimation. We derive
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the corresponding weights wMV from
wMV = argmin
w
w′Σw, (15)
subject to the full investment and positivity constraints w′1 = 1 and w ≥ 0.
Third, we construct the original risk parity (RP) strategy by allocating capital in such a manner
that the asset classes risk budgets contribute equally to the overall portfolio risk. Note that these
risk budgets also depend on an expanding time-window estimation, starting from 36 monthly re-
turns. Since there are no closed-form solutions available, we follow Maillard, Roncalli, and Teiletche
(2010) to obtain wRP numerically via
wRP = argmin
w
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(wi(Σw)i − wj(Σw)j)2 (16)
which essentially minimizes the variance of the risk contributions. Again, the above-mentioned full
investment and positivity constraints apply.
Fourth, we use the approach of Choueifaty and Coignard (2008) to build maximum diversifica-
tion portfolios. To this end, the authors define a portfolio diversification ratio D(w):
D(w) =
w′ · σ√
w′Σw
, (17)
where σ is the vector of portfolio assets volatility. Thus, their most-diversified portfolio (MDP)
simply maximizes the ratio of two distinct definitions of portfolio volatility — i.e., the ratio of the
average portfolio assets volatility and the total portfolio volatility. We obtain MDP’s weights vector
wMDP by numerically computing:
wMDP = argmax
w
D(w). (18)
As for the other benchmarking strategies, we enforce the full investment and positivity constraints.
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3 Constructing Uncorrelated Commodity Risk Factors
Before analyzing principal portfolios and minimum risk factor torsions, we start with a brief dis-
cussion of our data and provide some descriptive statistics.
3.1 Data and preliminary analysis
We investigate risk-based commodity strategies using the 24 commodities included in a recent
version of the S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) from January 1983 to December
2014.5 Exposures to commodities are established by trading the corresponding futures contracts.
Data is sourced from Bloomberg, and we use the first nearby generic commodity futures as historical
time series of returns.6 For example, we use the ticker “NG1 Comdty” for trading natural gas.
Further, to ensure that we only consider returns of liquidly traded commodity futures contracts, we
align the start date of each commodity with the start date of the corresponding S&P GSCI single
commodity index.
Coming back to the commodity index considered, we see how the GSCI puts a high weight on
oil and gas compared to other major commodity indices, such as the Dow Jones UBS Commodity
Index or the UBS Bloomberg CMCI. The annualized excess return of the GSCI, measured from
January 1983 to December 2014, amounts to 2.8% at a volatility of 19.6%, which implies a Sharpe
ratio of 0.14. Among the constituent commodities there are multiple time series with more sizable
volatility figures, see Table 1. The range is from 14.0% (live cattle) to 58.7% (natural gas). Likewise,
the range of annualized returns is quite large. Brent and unleaded gas oil show the highest excess
return (18.1%), while Natural Gas had the lowest return (-5.7%). Across the board, we note that
investing in single commodities entails significant downside risk. The maximum 1 year loss within
the three decades covered by our data ranges from -22.7% (feeder cattle) to -84.2% (natural gas).
5See Table 1 for the complete list of the underlying commodities considered.
6Commodity futures are combined via the Bloomberg default roll-over methodology available in the GFUT function
of Bloomberg. The default settings impose the roll-over of a future contract to the next expiring contract at the
beginning of the contract month, or alternatively at the last trading day, as indicated in Bloomberg, should this
happen before the contract month. Further, to obtain an excess return view on the commodity the time series of
returns are backward adjusted by selecting the option “adjust for ratio” in the GFUT function of Bloomberg.
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To get a first idea of the diversification potential inherent in the commodities universe, we
investigate the average correlation structure during the sample period from 1983 to 2014. In par-
ticular, Table 2 reduces the full correlation matrix to a sector correlation matrix, giving the average
within-sector and between-sector correlations of the eight main commodity sectors corresponding
to the 24 commodities. The within-sector correlations are calculated by averaging the pairwise
correlations among all commodity futures, in each sector for each year in our sample period.7
Table 2
Commodity Sector Correlations
The table summarizes the average within- and between-sector correlations of the 24 commodities of the S&P
GSCI grouped in eight commodity sectors. The within-sector correlations are calculated by averaging the
pairwise correlations across all commodity futures, in each sector, for each year, of the sample period. The
between-sector correlations are obtained by averaging the correlations between individual futures in the two
sectors for each year of the sample period from January 1983 to December 2014.
Commodity Sector Crude Ref. Natural Industrial Precious Grains Softs Live
Oil Prod. Gas Metals Metals Stocks
Crude Oil 0.96
Refined Products 0.83 0.90
Natural Gas 0.29 0.35 1.00
Industrial Metals 0.29 0.29 0.05 0.65
Precious Metals 0.22 0.24 0.05 0.29 0.86
Grains 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.19 0.72
Softs 0.07 0.10 -0.01 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.32
Livestocks 0.06 0.08 -0.05 0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.65
The between-sector correlations for any pair of groups is obtained by averaging the correlations
between individual futures in both groups over each year in our sample period. While all of the
within-sector correlations are generally high, the between-sector correlations most often are not,
which confirms the findings of Vrugt, Bauer, Molenaar, and Steenkamp (2007). On the one hand,
the most heterogeneous commodity sector is softs, given the within-correlations of 0.32. On the
other hand, the energy and metals sectors prove to be more in sync, given the within-correlations
close to one. Between sectors, livestock, as well as softs, are hardly correlated to anything else.
7While the correlation matrix is based on custom commodity returns, our findings are consistent with the corre-
lation matrix arising from sector indices as available from S&P GSCI.
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Most of the remaining between-sector correlations are lower than 0.3, with the exception of the
one between crude oil and refined oil (0.83). These preliminary results suggest that there is ample
room for diversification within the universe of commodities.
3.2 Principal portfolios and minimum torsions
In theory, one can construct as many principal portfolios as assets entering the PCA decomposition.
However, it is already well known that a small number of principal portfolios is sufficient to explain
most of the assets’ variation. We compute the 24 principal portfolios pertaining to the GSCI by
performing a PCA over an expanding window, starting with 36 months of observations.
In Panels A and C of Figure 1, we assess the relevance of the principal portfolios over time. We
observe that Principal Portfolio 1 (PP1) typically accounts for around 34% of total asset variability.
PP2 captures 18% on average, while PP3 captures 11%, thus leaving only single-digit fractions
for the subsequent principal portfolios PP4 to PP24. Of course, with their relevance quickly dying
off, it seems hardly reasonable to allocate any risk budget to higher principal portfolios. For the
empirical analysis, we decided to fix the first eight principal portfolios. These account for at least
80% of the dataset’s variation and is reflective of the 24 commodity assets falling into eight, rather
low correlated, industrial sectors.
While the first principal portfolios are designed to capture most of the commodities’ variance,
these factors are of purely statistical nature. Alternatively, one could resort to factors with a sound
economic rationale. Of course, such factors usually do not display zero correlation. Yet, applying
the minimum torsion of Meucci, Santangelo, and Deguest (2014) allows to de-correlate these factors
while sticking to the original factors as close as possible. From a risk factor view, the commodity
universe gives rise to a few persistent commodity risk factors.
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Figure 1. Principal Portfolios vs. Minimum Torsions
The upper charts give the variance of the principal portfolios and the minimum torsions, as well as their
relative decomposition over time. The lower charts give the box-plots pertaining to a given principal portfolios
or minimum risk factor torsions explained fraction of total variance over time. The results range from January
1986 to December 2014. The risk factors are market (Mkt), momentum (Mom), term structure (Trm), and
volatility (Vol) factor.
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Panel D: Minimum torsion factors
The work of Miffre and Rallis (2007), Basu and Miffre (2013), and Fuertes, Miffre and Rallis
(2010, 2013) identifies four main commodity risk factors: a market risk factor, a momentum factor,
a term structure factor, and a volatility factor. In this vein, we employ a commodity factor model,
where the excess return of the GSCI relative to the risk-free rate serves as the market return.
In addition, we construct three long-only factors as follows. At any given re-balancing date, we
sort the GSCI constituents according to the factor’s defining criterion, and equally invest in the
commodities corresponding to the top one third.8 For instance, the momentum factor is long the
8Note that factor portfolios therefore build on 4 commodities at the beginning of the sample period. This number
gradually increases over time up to a maximum of 8 commodities at the end of the sample period.
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top one third of the best performing commodities, as measured by the commodities’ past three
months’ return. As for the term structure factor, we rank commodities according to the steepness
of their corresponding term structure, where steepness is simply the relative difference between
the third and first nearby future contracts. The term structure factor is long the top one third
of commodities in normal backwardation. Hence, the term structure factor identifies strategies
which overweight commodities with more favorable term structures. Finally, the volatility factor
invests in commodities that experience low volatility over a prolonged period of time. This factor
sorts commodities in ascending order and invests in the top one third, thereby representing the
commodities with the lowest historical volatility as measured over three years of monthly return
data.
Table 3
Commodity Factor Correlations
The table summarizes the return, volatility, Sharpe ratio, and correlations of the commodity factors market,
momentum, term structure, and volatility, as well as the loadings in the corresponding minimum risk factor
torsions during January 1986 to December 2014.
Commodity Factors Market Momentum Term Structure Volatility
Panel A: Risk and Return Figures
Return p.a. 3.1% 12.4% 9.6% 2.9%
Volatility p.a. 20.3% 19.3% 17.9% 11.7%
Sharpe Ratio 0.15 0.64 0.54 0.25
Panel B: Correlations
Market 1.00 0.68 0.72 0.41
Momentum 0.68 1.00 0.75 0.52
Term Structure 0.72 0.75 1.00 0.50
Volatility 0.41 0.52 0.50 1.00
Panel C: Minimum Torsion Loadings
MT Market 1.42 -0.30 -0.49 -0.10
MT Momentum -0.29 1.50 -0.50 -0.34
MT Term Structure -0.38 -0.42 1.59 -0.28
MT Volatility -0.04 -0.13 -0.13 1.17
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Table 3 summarizes the risk-return profile of the chosen commodity factor model, as well as their
loadings in the minimum torsion factors, for the sample period from January 1986 to December
2014. The factors show a positive average yearly return, which ranges from 2.9% for the volatility
portfolio to 12.4% of the momentum factor. By construction, the volatility factor results in the
lowest volatility of 11.7% across the four factors. All commodity factors’ Sharpe ratios are positive.
The momentum portfolio has the highest Sharpe ratio (0.64), followed by the term structure (0.54),
and the volatility portfolios (0.27). The market portfolio’s (as represented by the S&P GSCI
Excess Return index) has the lowest Sharpe ratio (0.15) mainly due to the high volatility of its oil
constituents. The correlation between the commodity factors is considerably positive, and ranges
from 0.41 (market vs. volatility) to 0.75 (momentum vs. term structure). In Table 3 we also
highlight the loadings of the minimum risk factor torsions with regard to the original commodity
factor model. Every minimum risk factor torsion strongly loads on the respective factor to be
mimicked and leverages the remaining factors to ensure orthogonality.
In Panels B and D of Figure 1 we assess the risk decomposition of assets’ variability with
respect to a factor model driven by the minimum risk factor torsions. The orthogonalized market
factor (Mkt) accounts for 28% of total variability, the momentum factor (Mom) accounts for 36%,
followed by the term structure factor (Trm) with 24% of total explained variance on average, and the
volatility factor (Vol) explains 14%. Comparing the two alternative risk decompositions in Panels
A and B of Figure 1, we observe that the percentage of explained variance is considerably more
stable under the minimum torsion approach than the PCA one which, from a practical view-point,
is a highly desirable property.
3.3 Rationalizing principal portfolios and minimum risk factor torsions
To foster intuition with respect to the principal portfolios relative to the minimum risk factor
torsions, we investigate the single commodity loadings (or weights) of these two sets of uncorrelated
risk sources. Figure 2 plots these weights for the first four principal portfolios (in the left column)
and for the four minimum risk factor torsions (in the right column).
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Figure 2. Principal Portfolio vs. Minimum Torsion Weights
The figures on the left give the principal portfolio weights over time. The figures on the right show the
minimum torsion weights over time. The results are obtained using an expanding estimation window. The
results range from January 1986 to December 2014. Commodity sectors are crude oil (CO), refined products
(RP), gas (Ga), industrial metals (IM), precious metals (PM), grains (Gr), softs (So), and livestock (Li).
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Both the principal portfolio 1 (PP1) in Panel A of Figure 2 and the first minimum risk factor
torsion (MTMarket) in Panel B qualify for a common commodity risk factor with a net positive
weight for most constituent commodity assets. While this effect holds for PP1 by imposing it
to load on positive risk premiums only, this effect arises naturally for MTMarket that tracks the
market risk factor provided by the S&P GSCI. Unsurprisingly, both factors load more heavily
towards highly volatile commodity sectors like energy and metals rather than livestock. Beyond
PP1, the principal portfolios are less straightforward to interpret. Conversely, MTMomentum tracks
the commodity momentum factor and loads positively on oil and refined products, and it loads
negatively on precious metals and softs. MTTerm tracks the term structure factor. It is long
refined products, metals and short crude oil, natural gas, and grains. MTV olatility tracks the
volatility factor and trades grains against softs and livestock. Figure 2 further confirms the common
objection with respect to statistical risk factors derived from the principal component analysis,
namely the instability of factors over time. Clearly, minimum risk factor torsions provide a more
stable uncorrelated decomposition of the commodity asset universe over time. This is even more
so the case after the 90s, when more data is available. In contrast, principal portfolio weights still
change sign even towards the end of the sample period.
4 Diversified Commodity Investing
We next examine the empirical performance and risk profile of diversified risk parity strategies along
principal portfolios or minimum risk factor torsions vis-a`-vis selected benchmarks in a long-only
setup. Given that the first PCA estimation as well as the computation of the minimum risk factor
torsions consumes 36 months of data, the strategy performance can be assessed from January 1986
to December 2014.
82
Table 4
Performance and Risk Statistics of Risk-Based Commodity Strategies
The table gives performance and risk statistics of the risk-based commodity strategies from January 1986
to December 2014. Four versions of DRP strategies are considered: two DRP strategies, which diversify
by principal portfolios (PP); and two DRP strategies, which diversify by minimum risk factor torsions
(MT). For each type of DRP strategy, we report risk figures of the optimal unconstraint strategy (Opt.)
and those of the same strategy under long-only constraints (Con.). Annual return and volatility figures
are reported, together with the Sharpe ratio. Annual value at risk and expected shortfall are computed
at the 95% confidence level. One year maximum drawdown (Max. DD) is reported. Turnover is the
portfolios mean monthly turnover over the whole sample period. Gini coefficients are reported for portfolios
weights (GiniWeights), risk decomposition with respect to the underlying asset classes (GiniRisk), principal
portfolios (GiniPPRisk), and minimum factor torsions (GiniMTRisk). The #PPbets is the exponential of the
risk decomposition’s entropy, when measured against the principal portfolios, and #MTbets, when measured
against the minimum risk factor torsions.
Statistic Diversified Risk Parity S&P Risk-Based Allocations
PP MT GSCI 1/N MV RP MDP
Opt. Con. Opt. Con.
Panel A: Risk and Return Figures
Return -1.5% 7.3% 5.5% 5.1% 3.1% 3.9% 3.8% 3.5% 2.8%
Volatility 10.4% 16.4% 12.1% 12.3% 20.3% 12.9% 9.7% 10.8% 11.2%
SharpeRatio -0.15 0.44 0.46 0.42 0.15 0.31 0.40 0.32 0.25
VaR 95% -18.7% -19.7% -14.4% -15.1% -30.3% -17.3% -12.1% -14.3% -15.6%
ES 95% -23.0% -26.5% -19.4% -20.3% -38.7% -22.7% -16.2% -18.8% -20.3%
Max. DD -31.6% -37.2% -40.9% -43.4% -60.4% -45.5% -25.2% -39.4% -40.0%
Panel B: Weights and Risk Decomposition Characteristics
Turnover 22.2% 23.5% 2.6% 3.6% 0.4% 0.3% 3.9% 1.6% 4.3%
GiniWeights 0.34 0.65 0.27 0.41 0.53 0.00 0.58 0.25 0.44
GiniRisk 0.51 0.65 0.40 0.51 0.70 0.32 0.58 0.00 0.39
GiniPPRisk 0.00 0.17 0.37 0.26 0.51 0.41 0.21 0.29 0.24
GiniMTRisk 0.42 0.31 0.00 0.01 0.52 0.24 0.22 0.18 0.20
#PPbets 8.00 6.25 3.95 4.77 2.46 3.28 5.99 4.62 5.59
#MTbets 2.53 3.06 4.00 3.99 2.17 3.43 3.55 3.63 3.56
Panel A of Table 4 gives performance and risk statistics of the risk-based commodity strategies.
Across the board we find that the classic strategies yield similar annual returns. Unsurprisingly,
the lowest annual volatility (9.7%) is achieved by the minimum-variance strategy, together with an
annual return of 3.8%, which compares to 3.1% for the S&P GSCI. Also, its maximum drawdown
(-25.2%) is relatively small when compared to the one of the index (-60.4%).
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The volatility of 1/N is higher (12.9%) than that of the minimum-variance strategy, but it is
still smaller than the energy-induced GSCI volatility (20.3%). Also, the return of the 1/N strategy
amounts to 3.9%, resulting in a Sharpe ratio of 0.31. Hence, the risk-return profile of the GSCI is
inferior to the one given by the simple 1/N strategy. Reiterating Maillard, Roncalli, and Teiletche
(2010), we find that the traditional risk parity strategy is a middle-ground portfolio between 1/N
and minimum-variance. Its return is 3.5% at a volatility of 10.8%, giving rise to a Sharpe ratio of
0.32, which falls short of 0.40 for minimum-variance. Also, its maximum drawdown statistics are
slightly reduced when compared with the 1/N -strategy. The MDP fares similarly to the risk parity
strategy, giving slightly less return (2.8%) at higher volatility (11.2%).
Having recovered the well-known risk and return characteristics of the classic risk-based strate-
gies, we inspect the diversified risk parity strategies. In particular, we look at two distinct versions
of DRP strategies which derive from either diversifiying by principal portfolios or by minimum
risk factor torsions. For both versions, we investigate the optimal strategy (that might have short
positions) as well as a constrained long-only version.
Diversifying across principal portfolios, the optimal DRPPP strategy earns -1.5% at 10.4%
volatility. Restricting DRPPP to positive weights only curbing the strategy performance to give
7.3% return at 16.4% volatility. These figures correspond to a Sharpe ratio of 0.44. Note that
the constrained DRPPP entails the largest turnover among the risk-based commodity strategies
with 23.5%, suggesting that transaction costs may reduce the relative return potential. Conversely,
diversifying across minimum risk factor torsions is not associated with an excessive turnover for the
DRPMT—neither in the optimal (2.6%) nor the constrained version (3.6%). Moreover, the strategy
earns an average return of 5.5% at 12.1% volatility, thereby giving a Sharpe ratio of 0.46 in the
unconstrained optimal version. Enforcing long-only constraints, the risk-return characteristics of
the DRPMT hardly change. Its return of 5.1% at 12.3% volatility results in a Sharpe ratio of 0.42.
4.1 Risk and diversification characteristics
Judging risk-based strategies by their Sharpe ratios alone is not meaningful given that returns
are not entering the respective objective functions. In a similar vein, we resort to evaluating
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the strategies along their risk and diversification characteristics. We first decompose risk by the
underlying commodities, by the principal portfolios, and by the minimum risk factor torsions. This
approach provides us with a concise picture of the underlying risk structure and the number of
uncorrelated bets according to Equation (4) implemented in a given portfolio. The results are
reported in Panel B of Table 4.
To set the stage, we start by analyzing the GSCI and provide some aggregate figures summa-
rizing the characteristics of the weight decomposition on the commodity level. In Panel B of Table
4, we report different Gini coefficients. The Gini coefficient is a measure of concentration, which is
zero in case of no concentration (equal weights throughout time) and 1 in case of full concentration
(one commodity, principal portfolio, or minimum risk factor torsion attracts all of the weight all the
time). Therefore, the Gini coefficient serves as a diversification measure in its own right. We can
calculate Gini coefficients related on the risk decomposition by commodities (GiniRisk), the risk
decomposition by PPs (GiniPPRisk), and the one by minimum risk factor torsions (GiniMTRisk),
respectively. For the GSCI, the GiniWeights (0.53) and the GiniRisk (0.70) show the index to be
rather concentrated.
Unreported results confirm that the GSCI weights decomposition was dominated by softs and
grains in the mid-80s, and it slowly evolved into an energy-driven index. Moreover, according to
the risk decomposition by sectors, crude oil absorbs more than half of the risk budget most of the
time. In a similar vein, the GSCI is almost exclusively exposed to the single risk factor PP1 which,
typically accounts for 50% to 90% of the GSCIs total risk over time. Unsurprisingly, this result is
reinforced when risk is decomposed with respect to the minimum risk factor torsions. Interestingly,
this verdict seems to apply for the two other major commodities as well, the UBS Bloomberg
Constant Maturity Commodity Index and the Dow Jones UBS Commodity Index as depicted in
Figure 3. Even though these indices display a more diverse weights allocation, this observation
does not translate into a diverse risk allocation. Conversely, we document these indices to emerge
as one-bet strategies in most recent times.
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Figure 3. Weights and Risk Decompositions: Commodity Indices
The figure gives the decomposition of the S&P GSCI, Dow Jones UBS, and CMCI commodity indices in
terms of weights and risk. Indices are approximated by considering the commodities and weights reported in
Table 1. Risk is decomposed by asset classes, by principal portfolios, and by minimum risk factor torsions,
respectively. The first column contains the results for the S&P GSCI, the second column for Dow Jones UBS
the third column for the CMCI. The sample period is from January 1986 to December 2014. Commodity
sectors are crude oil (CO), refined products (RP), gas (Ga), industrial metals (IM), precious metals (PM),
grains (Gr), softs (So), and livestock (Li).
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In Table 4 we also report the Gini coefficients of the other strategies. By definition, the 1/N
strategy has a GiniWeights of zero, but it has a substantial GiniPPRisk of 0.41, almost as high
as the GiniPPRisk of the GSCI (0.51). Similarly, the GiniPPRisk and GiniMTRisk of the optimal
DRP strategies are zero for the DRPPP and DRPMT , respectively. They increase slightly for the
constrained version of the respective strategies.
Figures 4 and 5 depict sector weights and risk decompositions for 1/N , the minimum-variance
strategy, traditional risk parity, MDP, and the diversified risk parity strategies. For the 1/N strat-
egy, the risk decomposition by principal portfolios almost collapses into a single-coloured square,
which indicates that this portfolio is mainly exposed to market risk as represented by PP1. Ideally,
a portfolio that reflects eight uncorrelated bets should exhibit a risk parity profile along the PPs,
i.e. the decomposition should follow a constant 1/8 risk budget allocation over time.
The weights decomposition of minimum-variance is concentrated into a few assets because the
strategy is collecting the lowest volatility assets. In terms of commodity sector composition, the
minimum-variance strategy is overweighting more defensive sectors like softs and livestock; its risk
decomposition by principal portfolios is more diverse than the one for 1/N or the index. Still, PP1
explains around 60% of the total risk on average. As for the traditional risk parity strategy, the
weights decomposition is less concentrated, as is clear from an average GiniWeights of 0.25. However,
its risk decomposition by PPs merely indicates 4.62 out of eight bets on average. The MDP (5.59)
is similar to MV, which is slightly more diversified with 5.99 bets on average. Given that all the
classical risk-based strategies load heavily on the common risk factors, we are especially interested
in testing whether the DRP strategy provides a more diversified risk profile. When compared to
other strategies, the DRPPP strategy seems actively reallocating across sectors, see Figure 5.
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Figure 4. Weights and Risk Decompositions: Risk-Based Commodity Strategies
The figure gives the decomposition of the risk-based commodity strategies in terms of weights and risk. Risk
is decomposed by asset classes, by principal portfolios, and by minimum risk factor torsions, respectively.
The first column contains the results for the 1/N -strategy, the second column for minimum-variance, the
third column for the MDP. The sample period is from January 1986 to December 2014. Commodity sectors
are crude oil (CO), refined products (RP), gas (Ga), industrial metals (IM), precious metals (PM), grains
(Gr), softs (So), and livestock (Li).
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1/N: Volatility contributions by sector
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1/N: Volatility contributions by principal portfolios
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Figure 5. Weights and Risk Decompositions: Risk Parity Strategies
The figure decomposes risk parity strategies in terms of weights and risk. Risk is decomposed by asset
classes, by principal portfolios, and by minimum risk factor torsions, respectively. The first column
contains the results for traditional risk parity, the second column is for diversified risk parity along the
principal portfolios, and the third column is for diversified risk parity along minimum torsions. The sample
period is from January 1986 to December 2014. Commodity sectors are crude oil (CO), refined prod-
ucts (RP), gas (Ga), industrial metals (IM), precious metals (PM), grains (Gr), softs (So), and livestock (Li).
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DRPPP: Volatility contributions by sector
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RP: Volatility contributions by principal portfolios
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More importantly, the common risk factor represented by PP1 has lost its dominance on the
risk budget, which is reflected by the 6.25 bets on average in Table 4. The DRPPP strategy’s
combination of concentrated positioning, together with its active repositioning over time, seems
to be the key for maintaining a fairly balanced risk decomposition across the uncorrelated risk
sources. The DRPMT can be considered as a middle-ground portfolio between rather concentrated
strategies, such as the GSCI and the 1/N -strategy, and the DRPPP . Its number of bets, measured
across PPs (4.77), is comparable to one of the traditional RP strategy at 4.62. Conversely, when risk
is measured in terms of economically interpretable minimum torsions, the superior diversification
of DRPMT is evident given 3.99 bets out of the maximum number of four bets. Because of the
long-only nature of the chosen factor model, most strategies show high values, ranging from the
3.06 bets for DRPPP to 3.63 for RP. The odd one out is the GSCI with only 2.17 bets.
Figure 6 contrasts the strategies’ degree of diversification over time in terms of the number of
uncorrelated bets defined in Equation (4). First, note that the S&P GSCI index strategy is generally
dominated by the other strategies in the sense that it has the smallest number of uncorrelated bets.
While minimum-variance, MDP, and traditional risk parity represent a higher number of bets, one
can observe a significant deterioration in diversification over the last decade during the sample
period. As a result, 1/N , the GSCI, and risk parity are rendered one-bet strategies in terms of
principal portfolio bets. Conversely, diversified risk parity maintains the highest number of bets
over time according to the number of relevant principal portfolios, see the Panel C of Figure 1. Of
course, this observation is expected. On the right side of Figure 6, DRPMT dominates the other
strategies in terms of uncorrelated factor bets, with an average of 3.99 out of 4. Apart from the
GSCI, the other strategies nevertheless exhibit a medium to high number of uncorrelated factor
bets over time.
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Figure 6. Number of Uncorrelated Bets
The plot gives the number of uncorrelated bets for the risk-based commodity strategies with respect to the
principal portfolios (Panel A) and to the minimum risk factor torsions (Panel B). The data ranges from
January 1986 to December 2014.
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4.2 Dismantling risk-based commodity strategies
To further characterize the risk-based commodity strategies, we relate the strategies’ returns to
common risk factors. To this end, we rely on the following factor structure:
RRBS,t = α+ β1RMarket,t + β2RMomentum,t + β3RTermStructure,t + β4RV olatility,t + εt (19)
where RRBS,t is the excess return of one of the risk-based strategies relative to the risk-free rate.
We report the results in Table 5. As expected, the factor coefficients for the DRPMT are all
significant, not only for the optimal but also for the constrained strategy. In contrast, for the
DRPPP , only the market and the volatility factor do seem to have a significant influence on the
strategy’s return beyond the 5% significance level. None of the strategies deliver positive alpha
beyond the common risk factor controls. Similarly to DRPMT , the 1/N strategy loads significantly
on all common risk factors — however, with a larger load on the market factor. Furthermore, the
factors explain most of the 1/N strategy’s time series variation with an R2 of 79.9%. The variation
of the RP strategy is also well captured by the commodity factors with an adjusted R2 of 78.2%.
Rather than a uniform allocation across common factors, MV and RP show a strong tilt towards
low volatility assets (loading of 0.58 and 0.54, respectively).
The DRPMT strategy instead gives rise to a more balanced exposure towards the common
factors, which reflects their heterogeneous risk profile, loading less on the market, momentum and
term structure, and slightly more on low volatility assets. Interestingly, for all strategies, the loading
on low volatility assets is significant.
Only one-third of the excess time series variation can be attributed to common factors for
DRPPP (32.3%), while some two-thirds of the variation of DRPMT , MDP, and MV can be ex-
plained. We conjecture that the DRP might be playing commodity factors more actively than the
other strategies, making it hard to pinpoint these exposures in a static time series regression.
92
Table 5
Time Series Regressions of Risk-Based Commodity Strategies
The table gives time series regression results according to factor model (19) for the risk-based commodity
strategies using the period from January 1986 to December 2014. Four versions of DRP strategies are
considered: two DRP strategies, which diversify by principal portfolios (PP); and two DRP strategies, which
diversify by minimum risk factor torsions (MT). For each type of DRP strategy, we report regression results
of the optimal unconstrained strategy (Opt.) and those of the same strategy under long-only constraints
(Con.). Coefficients are in bold face when significant on a 5%-level; they are in italics when significant on a
10%-level. Below each coefficient the corresponding t-statistic is reported in parentheses.
Statistic Diversified Risk Parity Risk-Based Allocations
PP MT 1/N MV RP MDP
Opt. Con. Opt. Con.
Regression Coefficients & t-Statistics
Alpha (%) -0.21 0.31 0.17 0.10 -0.06 0.14 -0.01 -0.04
(-1.37) (1.40) (1.41) (0.90) (-0.60) (1.37) (-0.12) (-0.31)
Market 0.11 0.29 0.17 0.13 0.23 0.03 0.12 0.08
(2.73) (5.26) (5.62) (4.69) (9.69) (1.32) (5.89) (2.84)
Momentum -0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.17 0.02 0.10 0.06
(-1.72) (1.32) (1.97) (2.16) (6.22) (0.56) (4.24) (1.86)
Term Str. 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.09
(2.31) (0.82) (2.16) (3.13) (2.02) (0.77) (1.86) (2.26)
Volatility 0.17 0.23 0.46 0.51 0.44 0.58 0.54 0.50
(3.32) (3.03) (11.32) (13.09) (13.90) (16.88) (19.36) (12.39)
Adj. R2 15.9 32.3 62.3 66.5 79.9 59.1 78.2 58.0
5 Robustness checks
In this section, we perform a series of robustness checks.
5.1 Rolling window analysis
All of the presented results build on an expanding window estimation. While this approach usually
introduces a meaningful degree of stability, one may argue that a rolling window analysis can be
more adaptive with respect to changes in the risk structure.
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Table 6
Risk-Based Commodity Strategies: Rolling window analysis
The table gives performance and risk statistics of the risk-based commodity strategies from January 1986
to December 2014, based on rolling window analysis with a 36 months estimation window. Four versions of
DRP strategies are considered: two DRP strategies, which diversify by principal portfolios (PP); and two
DRP strategies, which diversify by minimum risk factor torsions (MT). For each type of DRP strategy, we
report risk figures of the optimal unconstraint strategy (Opt.) and those of the same strategy under long-
only constraints (Con.). Annual return and volatility figures are reported, together with the Sharpe ratio.
Annual value at risk and expected shortfall are computed at the 95% confidence level. One year maximum
drawdown (Max. DD) is reported. Turnover is the portfolios mean monthly turnover over the whole sample
period. Gini coefficients are reported for portfolios weights (GiniWeights), risk decomposition with respect
to the underlying asset classes (GiniRisk), principal portfolios (GiniPPRisk), and minimum factor torsions
(GiniMTRisk). The #PPbets is the exponential of the risk decompositions entropy, when measured against
the principal portfolios, and #MTbets, when measured against the minimum risk factor torsions. The table
reports statistics obtained investing in S&P GSCI single commodity indices.
Statistic Diversified Risk Parity S&P Risk-Based Allocations
PP MT GSCI 1/N MV RP MDP
Opt. Con. Opt. Con.
Panel A: Risk and Return Figures
Return 3.4% 5.4% 4.7% 5.0% 3.1% 3.9% 3.4% 3.4% 2.9%
Volatility 11.2% 16.4% 12.8% 15.4% 20.3% 12.9% 9.7% 10.7% 11.5%
SharpeRatio 0.30 0.33 0.37 0.32 0.15 0.31 0.35 0.32 0.25
VaR 95% -15.0% -21.6% -16.3% -20.4% -30.3% -17.3% -12.7% -14.3% -16.0%
ES 95% -19.7% -28.5% -21.7% -26.8% -38.7% -22.7% -16.7% -18.7% -20.9%
Max. DD -32.4% -33.8% -32.4% -50.2% -60.4% -45.5% -26.4% -37.0% -37.7%
Panel B: Weights and Risk Decomposition Characteristics
Turnover 36.9% 38.4% 10.7% 22.7% 0.4% 0.3% 8.1% 3.3% 9.2%
GiniWeights 0.33 0.65 0.30 0.43 0.53 0.00 0.58 0.27 0.48
GiniRisk 0.50 0.64 0.46 0.52 0.69 0.31 0.58 0.00 0.43
GiniPPRisk 0.00 0.18 0.36 0.35 0.49 0.43 0.20 0.31 0.24
GiniMTRisk 0.43 0.37 0.00 0.07 0.52 0.29 0.26 0.22 0.23
#PPbets 8.00 6.00 3.74 3.95 2.74 3.12 5.94 4.54 5.67
#MTbets 2.47 2.81 4.00 3.92 2.11 3.18 3.41 3.47 3.41
To investigate this possibility, we have repeated the computation of the risk-based commodity
strategies using a rolling window of 36 months. Table 6 gives the according strategy results. The
baseline findings continue to hold, although the strategies’ returns tend to be slightly smaller com-
pared to the expanding window case. More importantly, the strategies’ turnover unduly increases.
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While this result obviously relates to the increased responsiveness of the strategies to changes in
the risk structure, the associated increase in transaction costs will further decrease the strategies’
performance. These effects are most pronounced for the DRP strategies, which should naturally
benefit from a more robust estimation of the underlying commodity factor correlation structure.
5.2 Altering the underlying roll day assumption
All of the presented results depend on generic commodity future returns that are computed using
the default Bloomberg settings. It is natural to investigate the strategies’ results under different
assumptions regarding the rolling of the contracts. In Figure 7, we plot risk and return figures and
the ensuing Sharpe ratio for different roll-day assumptions ranging from 1 day to 25 days prior
contract expiry. First, we note that a given strategy’s return tends to increase the closer we move
towards expiry. The latter finding holds for all strategies including DRP across minimum risk factor
torsions but excluding DRP across principal portfolios. The latter will most likely relate to the
principal portfolios’ instability. Second, the volatility of the different strategies is robust to changes
in the roll day. Third, the ranking of strategies in terms of risk-adjusted performance across any
roll-day bucket is consistent with the baseline results of our analysis favoring diversified risk parity
strategies along minimum risk factor torsions.
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Figure 7. Performance of Risk-Based Commodity Strategies by Roll Day
The plot gives the average return and volatility p.a. together with the corresponding Sharpe ratio for all
risk-based commodity strategies. Results are derived by rolling-over contracts X days before expiry, where
X takes the values 1, 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, or 25 days. Strategy performance is evaluated over January 1986 to
December 2014.
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6 Conclusion
Given an increased desire for risk control emanating from the most recent financial crisis, there
has been considerable interest for investors in strategies seeking for maximum diversification. As
noticed in Lintner (1983), commodity futures, portfolios, indices, and CTAs provide diversification
opportunities for investors due to their low correlation with respect to stocks and bonds.
Our research objective was to exploit these stylized facts when exploring new ways of commodity
investing, which would provide maximum diversification along uncorrelated risk sources inherent
in the commodity universe. Judging by the results from our study, diversified risk parity strategies
are distinct in several aspects from the prevailing risk-based portfolio construction paradigms.
Moreover, our research has several practical implications. First, we have extracted the relevant
uncorrelated risk sources embedded in a classic commodity universe and fostered intuition with
respect to their economic nature. Second, the framework is a convenient risk management tool
for decomposing the risk of any given strategy by uncorrelated risk sources and for assessing its
degree of diversification. Third, the diversified risk parity strategies represent an innovative way of
risk-based portfolio construction to generate truly diversified commodity portfolios.
Besides the above long-only strategies, the commodity futures market provides a natural en-
vironment for implementing long-short self-financing strategies. Our empirical results show that
diversified risk parity strategies maintain a balanced exposure to the commodity market’s un-
correlated risk sources. Allowing for negative weights, there is even more room to exploit the
diversification potential via diversified risk parity strategies.
97
References
Ang, A., R.J. Hodrick, Y. Xing, and X. Zhang, 2006, The cross-section of volatility and expected
returns, Journal of Finance 61, 259–299.
Basu, D., and J. Miffre, 2013, Capturing the risk premium of commodity futures: The role of
hedging pressure, Journal of Banking and Finance 37, 2652–2664.
Bodie, Z., and V. Rosansky, 2000, Risk and return in commodity futures, Financial Analysts
Journal 36, 27–39.
Bruder, B., and T. Roncalli, 2012, Managing risk exposures using the risk budgeting approach,
Working paper, Lyxor Asset Management.
Choueifaty, Y., and Y. Coignard, 2008, Toward maximum diversification, Journal of Portfolio
Management 34, 40–51.
Erb, C.B., and C. Harvey, 2006, The tactical and strategic value of commodity futures, Financial
Analysts Journal 62, 69–97.
Fuertes, A.M., A. Fernandez-Perez, and J. Miffre, 2016, Is idiosyncratic volatility priced in com-
modity futures markets?, International Review of Financial Analysis forthcoming.
Fuertes, A.M., J. Miffre, and G. Rallis, 2010, Tactical allocation in commodity futures markets:
Combining momentum and term structure signals, Journal of Banking and Finance 34, 2530–
2548.
Fuertes, A.M., J. Miffre, and G. Rallis, 2013, Strategic and tactical roles of enhanced commodity
indices, Journal of Futures Markets 33, 965–992.
Kat, H., and R. Oomen, 2007, What every investor should know about commodities, Part I:
Univariate return analysis, Journal of Investment Management 5.
Lintner, J.K., 1983, The potential role of managed commodity — Financial futures accounts in
portfolios of stocks and bonds, Working paper, Annual Conference of the Financial Analysts
Federation, Toronto, Canada.
Lohre, H., H. Opfer, and G. Orsza´g, 2014, Diversifying risk parity, Journal of Risk 16, 53–79.
98
Maillard, S., T. Roncalli, and J. Teiletche, 2010, The properties of equally weighted risk contribution
portfolios, Journal of Portfolio Management 36, 60–70.
Markowitz, H.M., 1952, Portfolio selection, Journal of Finance 7, 77–91.
Meucci, A., 2009, Managing diversification, Risk 22, 74–79.
Meucci, A., A Santangelo, and R. Deguest, 2014, Measuring portfolio diversification based on
optimized uncorrelated factors, Working paper, SYMMYS.
Miffre, J., 2016, Long-short commodity investing: A review of the literature, Journal of Commodity
Markets 1, 3–13.
Miffre, J., and G. Rallis, 2007, Momentum strategies in commodity futures markets, Journal of
Banking and Finance 31, 1863 – 1886.
Partovi, M.H., and M. Caputo, 2004, Principal portfolios: Recasting the efficient frontier, Eco-
nomics Bulletin 7, 1–10.
Qian, E., 2006, On the financial interpretation of risk contribution: Risk budgets do add up, Journal
of Investment Management 4, 1–11.
Qian, E., 2011, Risk parity and diversification, Journal of Investing 20, 119–127.
Roncalli, T., and G. Weisang, 2012, Risk parity portfolios with risk factors, Working paper, Lyxor
Asset Management.
Scherer, B., 2011, A note on the returns from minimum variance investing, Journal of Empirical
Finance 18, 652–660.
Vrugt, E., R. Bauer, R. Molenaar, and T. Steenkamp, 2007, Dynamic commodity timing strategies,
in H. Till, and J. Eagleeye, eds.: Intelligent Commodity Investing (Risk Books, London ).
99
Part IV
Second Order Risk In Alternative Risk Parity
Strategies
Simone Bernardi, Markus Leippold, and Harald Lohre
Abstract
The concept of second order risk operationalizes estimation risk in portfolio construction induced
by model uncertainty. In this paper we study its contribution to realized volatility of recently
developed risk parity strategies. For each strategies we derive closed-form solutions of second order
risk, to be illustrated in empirical analysis based on real market data. These results suggest a
relation between the contribution of second order risk and the sensitivity of portfolios to single
eigenvectors of the covariance matrix of assets’ returns. Among the strategies considered, we find
the principal risk parity strategy, that equally invests in each eigenvector underlying the variance-
covariance matrix, to be immune to second order risk. For the other strategies, second order risk
can be partially mitigated by means of statistical methods.
Keywords: Estimation Risk, Second Order Risk, Portfolio Construction, Risk Parity, Diversification
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1 Introduction
When modern portfolio theory emerged with the seminal paper of Markowitz (1952) on mean–
variance (MV) optimization, estimation risk was mostly neglected and the estimated parameters
were treated as if they were the true parameters. However, especially in finance, estimation risk
is unavoidable. As indicated by a wide number of authors, such as Jobson, Korkie, and Ratti
(1979), Jorion (1986), and Michaud (1989), allocating assets following the mean–variance paradigm
without recognizing the existence of the estimation risk inherent in the parameters has a huge
impact on the optimized portfolios and leads to several undesirable features and deficiencies, such
as, unstable weights, concentrated allocations, excessive portfolio turnover, lower returns, and the
realized portfolio volatility’s exceeding the ex ante expected volatility.1
This last deficiency, a higher realized volatility than expected, has been studied in Shepard
(2009), who defined a risk measure to quantify what he dubbed the Second-Order Risk (SOR)
bias in optimized portfolios, i.e., a systematic deviation, induced by model uncertainty, of realized
volatility from in-sample volatility. Sheppard also shows that the unconstrained minimum-variance
(MV) portfolio suffers from a systematic SOR bias, which is proportional to the ratio of the number
of assets to the number of in-sample observations considered in the portfolio construction. The
analyzed SOR bias is consequently found to be especially pronounced for short estimation periods.
Only when the number of observations is considerably greater than the number of assets does the
SOR bias tend to disappear. More recently, Stefanovits, Schubiger, and Wu¨trich (2015) extend
the empirical study of the SOR bias to the most-diversified portfolio approach of Choueifaty and
Coignard (2008) and to the traditional risk parity of Maillard, Roncalli, and Teiletche (2010), with
similar findings, suggesting that the SOR bias is rather a common denominator across different
portfolio construction methods than an undesirable side effect limited to the MV optimization
framework.
In the present paper we advance the study of SOR bias by looking at its contribution to
the realized volatility of recently developed alternative risk parity strategies that allocate along
1See, for example, DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009), who empirically corroborate that some 500 years of
monthly in-sample observations are necessary for the MV portfolio to outperform the 1/N portfolio in an asset
universe of 50 U.S. stocks.
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Principal Portfolios (PPs), i.e., the eigenvectors out of a principal component analysis (PCA) of
the covariance matrix of the assets returns. Inspired by the work of Partovi and Caputo (2004),
various authors have recognized the appealing properties of investing in terms of principal portfolios
which have zero correlations by design, unlike the correlations of the underlying assets. Hence, PPs
allow for a more natural description of the diversification properties of the asset universe, see Meucci
(2009).
Recently, the Diversified Risk Parity (DRP) strategy, the analogue of the risk parity strategy
of Maillard, Roncalli, and Teiletche (2010) but in the principal portfolio space, aims at equally
weighting the contribution of each principal portfolio to the risk, where the risk is measured in
terms of the volatilities of the PPs. The DRP strategy has been studied in Lohre, Neugebauer,
and Zimmer (2012) with a focus on U.S. equities, and in Kind (2013) as well as Lohre, Opfer, and
Orsza´g (2014) in a multi-asset investment universe. In its optimal unconstrained version, the DRP
strategy invests in each PP proportionally to the inverse of the square root of the corresponding
eigenvalues, i.e., proportional to the inverse of the volatilities of the PPs. In addition, we consider
two alternative variations of the DRP strategy. First, we look at the 1/V portfolio, which weights
the PPs by the inverse of the corresponding eigenvalues, i.e., proportional to the inverse of the
variances of the PPs. Second, we consider a strategy mentioned in Hall (2012). The author
proposes a strategy which could be interpreted as the analogue of the equally weighted portfolio, or
1/N strategy, in PP space. This strategy suggests investing in the main uncorrelated risk sources
in a more natural fashion than the DRP and the 1/V portfolio. Instead of having equal budget
risks across PPs, the risk is budgeted proportionally to the contribution of each PP to the total
variance. As a result, the lion’s share of capital is allocated to the most significant uncorrelated
risk source, that potentially carry risk premia with a higher probability, hence basically neglecting
most of the less significant PPs. Technically, one is simply allocating equal weights to the PPs,
which is why we call it Principal Risk Parity (PRP).
The common denominator of the considered alternative risk parity strategies is that they invest
in an uncorrelated decomposition of the asset universe provided by the PCA. We note that the
PCA is by no means unique in decomposing the asset universe into uncorrelated risk sources.
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Leveraging on the work of Meucci, Santangelo, and Deguest (2015), various authors have proposed
more sophisticated versions of alternative risk parity strategies, which we do not consider in this
study. Among others, Kind and Poonia (2015) apply the minimum torsion directly to the underlying
assets. Bernardi, Leippold, and Lohre (2018) start from an economically well founded commodity
factor model and obtain uncorrelated risk sources by applying minimum rotations to it.
For each selected alternative risk parity strategy we derive analytical closed-form solutions for
the corresponding SOR bias, assuming the assets’ returns are normally distributed. The SOR bias
of the 1/V strategy (which invests in the PPs in inverse proportion to their variance) is comparable
to the SOR bias of the MV portfolio. As for the optimal DRP strategy (which instead invests in
the PPs in proportion to the square root of the inverse of the corresponding principal portfolio’s
variances) we show that its SOR bias is approximately equal to the square root of the SOR bias
of the 1/V and MV portfolios. This correlation between the magnitude of the corresponding SOR
bias and the weight assigned to the PPs sheds light on the lower exposure of the DRP strategy to
low-volatility PPs. This observation enhances expectations about an even lower SOR bias for the
PRP strategy (as this portfolio invests in the PPs by equally weighting them, i.e., by allowing every
single PP to contribute to the overall portfolio volatility proportionally to its own volatility). Also,
the PRP strategy appears to be immune from the SOR bias and therefore not subject to systematic
risk underestimation. All in all, these results shed an interesting light on the relation between the
weighting of the principal portfolios and the contribution of SOR to a realized portfolio’s volatility.
These findings resonate well with the observation in DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009), who
report less sensitivity to estimation risk for the correlation matrix than the covariance matrix when
these are used as inputs to portfolio optimization. By equally weighting the PPs, the PRP strategy
exclusively leverages the estimation of the correlation structure of the asset returns as given by the
corresponding loading matrix defining the PPs. Instead, the 1/V , DRP, and MV strategies require
the additional estimation of the eigenvalues for their portfolio optimization.
Our analytical results are further confirmed by empirical analysis. We consider alternative risk
parity strategies (together with the MV, the equally weighted, and a random portfolio as controls)
and calculate their SOR bias over the last 10 years by running these strategies on the Fama–French
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industry portfolios of real equity market data as provided by the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP). We assess the SOR contribution to realized volatility by varying the number of
assets as well as the number of in-sample observations considered. Additionally, we compare the
SOR bias before and after applying estimation risk mitigation procedures to the covariance matrix.
In particular, we look at simple bootstrapping, the linear shrinkage of Ledoit and Wolf (2004a),
and the eigenvalue adjustment of Menchero, Wang, and Orr (2012).2 In contrast to eigenvalue
adjustment, bootstrapping historical returns and linear shrinkage do not directly address the SOR
bias in portfolio construction. Still, both methods seek to mitigate the negative effects of estimation
risk. Given that the SOR bias is a measure of the estimation risk as well, we expect these methods
to positively influence that dimension. In our empirical study we find that linear shrinkage only
marginally helps to reduce the SOR bias. The simple bootstrapping method hardly mitigates the
SOR bias across the analyzed strategies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework
and provides closed-form solutions for the SOR bias of alternative risk parity strategies. Section 3
provides empirical evidence of the effects of SOR on the realized volatility of portfolio construction
strategies and sheds light on the performance of well-known estimation risk-mitigation methodolo-
gies on the SOR bias. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Second-Order Risk and Risk-Based Portfolio Construction
2.1 Second-Order Risk
In this section we describe the framework we use to assess the estimation risk in portfolio con-
struction strategies. Due to the difficulties in predicting returns, our study focuses on the effects
of estimation risk for a set of risk-based portfolio construction strategies which rely on the sample
2Among others, Johnstone (2001), Ledoit and Wolf (2004b), Karoui (2008), and Stefanovits, Schubiger, and
Wu¨trich (2015) study the spectrum of the sample covariance matrix and propose alternative estimators of the covari-
ance matrix, derived by individual adjustment of each eigenvalue. Although the sample estimate of the covariance
matrix is an unbiased estimator of the true covariance matrix, these authors demonstrate that its eigenvalues greatly
deviate from the true ones, especially when the number of assets considered greatly exceed the sample size. There is
a systematic upward bias for the largest sample eigenvalues, whereas the smallest ones appear to be slightly biased
downwards.
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covariance matrix of the assets’ excess returns as the sole parameter. We consider a sample period
of length T ∈ N, (e.g., T trading days) and a realized (or out-of-sample) period of the same length.
Going forward we will differentiate between statistics constructed for the in-sample and those con-
structed for the realized period by labeling them accordingly. In this setup, we consider a universe
of N assets with sample excess returns Rˆ ∈ RN×T and covariance matrix Ωˆ ∈ RN×N , where
Ωˆ =
1
T
RˆRˆ
′
. (1)
Analogously, the realized excess return is denoted by R ∈ RN×T and the covariance matrix by
Ω ∈ RN×N , where
Ω =
1
T
RR
′
. (2)
Then, we define wˆ := w(Rˆ, Ωˆ) to be a vector of portfolio weights derived on the basis of sample
returns and volatility matrix. In our framework, the estimation risk is measured by looking at the
second-order risk of portfolio strategies, defined as the ratio of realized over sample portfolio vari-
ance. Hence, for a portfolio strategy wˆ, the corresponding second-order risk bias can be computed
as follows
SOR(wˆ) :=
σ2realized(wˆ)
σ2sample(wˆ)
=
E
[
wˆ
′
Ωwˆ
]
E
[
wˆ
′
Ωˆwˆ
] . (3)
On the one hand, an SOR bias equal to 1 characterizes a robust portfolio construction strategy.
This is trivially the case for the 1/N portfolio, whose weights are proportional to
w1/N := 1. (4)
Obviously, these weights do not depend on the sample covariance matrix. The SOR bias for this
portfolio is derived as follows
SOR(w1/N ) =
E
[
1
′
Ω1
]
E
[
1′Ωˆ1
] = 1′Ω1
1′E
[
Ωˆ
]
1
= 1. (5)
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On the other hand, an SOR bias different from 1 indicates that the portfolio strategy systematically
suffers from estimation risk; this calls for the application of estimation risk mitigation techniques.
Another popular example is the minimum-variance portfolio (MV). Shepard (2009) shows that
the MV portfolio with weights proportional to
wˆMV := Ωˆ
−11, (6)
suffers from a systematic SOR bias, which is proportional to the ratio of the number of assets N
to the length of the sample period T . More precisely, under the assumption that the underlying
asset excess returns are normally distributed with mean zero and covariance matrix Ω, the sample
covariance matrix Ωˆ, as defined in equation (1), follows a Wishart distribution, i.e., T × Ωˆ ∼
WN (Ω, T ).3 Using this result, (Shepard 2009) derives a closed-form formula for the SOR bias of
the optimal MV portfolio wˆMV given by equation (6) as
SOR(wˆMV ) =
E
[
wˆ
′
MV ΩwˆMV
]
E
[
wˆ
′
MV ΩˆwˆMV
] = 1′E
[
Ωˆ−1ΩΩˆ−1
]
1
1′E
[
Ωˆ−1ΩˆΩˆ−1
]
1
(A)'
(
1− N
T
)−3 1′Ω−11
1′E
[
Ωˆ−1
]
1
(B)'
(
1− N
T
)−2 1′E [Ωˆ−1]1
1′E
[
Ωˆ−1
]
1
=
(
1− N
T
)−2
,
where approximations (A) and (B) are based on results regarding the first two moments of the
inverse Wishart distribution which drop O(1/N) and O(1/T ) terms for simplicity.4
3The Wishart distribution is the multivariate case of the χ2-distribution.
4In particular, for the Inverse Wishart distribution, one has
(A) E
[
Ωˆ−1ΩΩˆ−1
]
=
(T − 1)T 2
(T −N)(T −N − 1)(T −N − 3)Ω
−1 '
(
1− N
T
)−3
Ω−1
(B)'
(
1− N
T
)−2
E
[
Ωˆ−1
]
(B) E
[
Ωˆ−1
]
=
(
1− N − 1
T
)−1
Ω−1 '
(
1− N
T
)−1
Ω−1.
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Not only does Shepard (2009) quantify the second-order risk induced by the weights of the MV
portfolio, he also uses the above result to obtain an unbiased estimator for its variance:
σˆ2MV := wˆ
′
MV ΩˆwˆMV
(
1− N
T
)−2
, (7)
and it thus holds that
E
[
σˆ2MV
∣∣∣Ω] = σˆ2MV . (8)
This correction depends only on the number of assets and the number of observations used for
the in-sample calculation of the covariance matrix. For example, assuming an in-sample period of
1 year (with approximately 252 trading days) and an asset universe of 75 securities, equation (7)
implies that the in-sample predicted variance of the MV portfolio returns is twice as high as the
realized out-of-sample portfolio variance.
2.2 Second-Order Risk of Alternative Risk Parity Strategies
In the following we examine the SOR bias pertaining to alternative risk parity strategies that invest
in uncorrelated risk sources embedded in the underlying asset universe. These uncorrelated risk
sources are the principal components (or principal portfolios, PP) of the PCA decomposition of the
sample covariance matrix, i.e.,
Ωˆ = Uˆ′ΛˆUˆ, (9)
where Uˆ is the matrix of eigenvectors of Ωˆ representing the loadings of the principal components
and Λˆ = diag(λi)i=1,...,N is the diagonal matrix containing the variances of the corresponding
eigenvalues. Because of the uncorrelatedness of the PPs, their marginal contribution to portfolio
diversification is considerable. The overall portfolio variance σ2sample can be represented as the
weighted sum of the variances of the PPs:
σ2sample := wˆ
′
Ωˆwˆ =
N∑
i=1
w˜2i λˆi, (10)
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where w˜ := Uˆwˆ translates portfolio weights wˆ into principal portfolio weights w˜. Then, a port-
folio’s SOR bias is the weighted average (based on the weights of the PP) of the SOR bias of
each single PP. Systematically altering the weighting of the PPs can thus be expected to lead to a
systematic change in the SOR bias of the portfolio. We investigate this aspect by looking at the
related portfolio strategies.
2.2.1 Inverse-variance in principal portfolios
First, we consider the 1/V portfolio that invests in each PP proportionally to the inverse of the
corresponding PP’s variance5 and thus strongly loads on low volatility PPs. The portfolio weights
are proportional to
wˆ1/V := UˆΛˆ
−11. (11)
To compute the SOR bias we consider the unnormalized version of portfolio weights in equation
(11) and separately evaluate the realized and the sample risk estimates. For the former, we obtain
E
[
wˆ
′
1/V Ωwˆ1/V
]
= E
[
E
[
1
′
Λˆ−1Uˆ
′
ΩUˆΛˆ−11
∣∣∣Uˆ]]
= E
[
1
′
Uˆ
′
E
[
UˆΛˆ−1Uˆ
′
ΩUˆΛˆ−1Uˆ
′
∣∣∣Uˆ] Uˆ1]
= E
[
1
′
Uˆ
′
E
[
Ωˆ−1ΩΩˆ−1
∣∣∣Uˆ] Uˆ1]
(A)'
(
1− N
T
)−2
E
[
1
′
Uˆ
′
Ωˆ−1Uˆ1
]
=
(
1− N
T
)−2 N∑
k=1
E
[
1/λˆk
]
.
For the sample risk estimate, we obtain
E
[
wˆ
′
1/V Ωˆwˆ1/V
]
= E
[
1
′
Λˆ−1Uˆ
′
ΩˆUˆΛˆ−11
]
= E
[
1
′
Λˆ−1ΛˆΛˆ−11
]
=
N∑
k=1
E
[
1/λˆk
]
, (12)
5As every one of the principal portfolios can be bought or sold, there exist 2N asset allocations, where N is the
number of principal portfolios, all of which are inverse variance strategies. A unique strategy is consequently obtained
by imposing a sign constraint on the principal portfolios. For the empirical part of this paper, we align the sign of
each principal portfolio with the one of its corresponding historical risk premia over a given time period.
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Hence, the SOR bias of the 1/V portfolio can be approximated as follows:
SOR(wˆ1/V ) =
E
[
wˆ
′
1/V Ωwˆ1/V
]
E
[
wˆ
′
1/V Ωˆwˆ1/V
] ' (1− N
T
)−2
, (13)
The SOR bias derived in equation (13) for the 1/V strategy is thus of the same magnitude as the
SOR bias of the MV portfolio in equation (7). Thus, equation (7) is an unbiased estimator of the
variance of the 1/V strategy as well.
2.2.2 Diversified Risk Parity: Inverse volatility along principal portfolios
Second, we consider the diversified risk parity (DRP) strategy. Similar to the 1/V portfolio, the
DRP strategy invests in uncorrelated risk sources as provided by the PPs pertaining to the PCA
decomposition of the sample covariance matrix. The DRP strategy especially leverages the following
diversification measure of Meucci (2009):
NEnt(w) = exp
(
−
N∑
i=1
p(w˜i) ln p(w˜i)
)
, (14)
where
p(w˜i) =
w˜2i λˆi∑N
i=1 w˜
2
i λˆi
, i = 1, ..., N. (15)
NEnt(w) can be interpreted as the number of uncorrelated risk sources that a given portfolio
strategy w is investing in. One hasNEnt(w) = 1 for a fully concentrated strategy andNEnt(w) = N
for a fully diversified strategy. The weights of the DRP strategy are constructed by maximizing
the diversification measure NEnt(w), i.e.,
wˆDRP = argmax
w∈C
NEnt(w). (16)
Maximizing the diversification is equivalent to allocating an equal risk budget to every uncorrelated
PP, subject to a set of allocation constraints C. In the absence of constraints, the DRP strategy
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has a closed-form solution that prescribes inverse volatility investing along principal portfolios.6 Its
weights are proportional to
wˆDRP := UˆΛˆ
−1/21. (17)
By weighting each PP inversely to the square root of its variance, the DRP ensures an equal contri-
bution to the total variance by each PP, reflecting the underlying idea of maximum diversification.
The DRP weighting appears to be more moderate, when compared to that of the 1/V strategy.
This more moderate weighting of the PPs should translate into a lower SOR bias. Similar to the
derivation of the SOR bias for the 1/V portfolio, we calculate the realized risk as well as the sample
risk estimates separately. For the realized risk, we have
E
[
wˆ
′
DRPΩwˆDRP
]
= E
[
E
[
1
′
Λˆ−1/2Uˆ
′
ΩUˆΛˆ−1/21
∣∣∣Uˆ]]
= E
[
1
′
Uˆ
′
E
[
UˆΛˆ−1/2Uˆ
′
ΩUˆΛˆ−1/2Uˆ
′
∣∣∣Uˆ] Uˆ1]
= E
[
1
′
Uˆ
′
E
[
Ωˆ−1/2ΩΩˆ−1/2
∣∣∣Uˆ] Uˆ1]
(C)'
(
1− N
T
)−1
E
[
1
′
Uˆ
′
Uˆ1
]
=
(
1− N
T
)−1
N,
where equation (C) follows from a heuristic derivation. The expression
E
[
Ωˆ−1/2ΩΩˆ−1/2
∣∣∣Uˆ] ,
dubbed the “Bias Matrix,” cannot be derived analytically. Thus, we verify the validity of our
approximation (C) via a Monte Carlo simulation, which we outline in Appendix 5.
The sample variance estimate can be calculated as follows:
E
[
wˆ
′
DRP ΩˆwˆDRP
]
= E
[
1
′
Λˆ−1/2Uˆ
′
ΩˆUˆΛˆ−1/21
]
= E
[
1
′
Λˆ−1/2Uˆ
′
UˆΛˆUˆ
′
UˆΛˆ−1/21
]
= E
[
1
′
Λˆ−1/2ΛˆΛˆ−1/21
]
= N.
6As with the 1/V strategy, uniqueness of the asset allocation is again guaranteed by means of sign constraints
based on the historically observed risk premia.
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The SOR bias for the DRP can be approximated as follows:
SOR(wˆDRP ) :=
E
[
wˆ
′
DRPΩwˆDRP
]
E
[
wˆ
′
DRP ΩˆwˆDRP
] (C)' (1− N
T
)−1
. (18)
Analogously to equation (7), we can derive an unbiased estimator of the DRP portfolio’s variance:
σˆ2DRP := wˆ
′
DRP ΩˆwˆDRP
(
1− N
T
)−1
. (19)
As in the cases of the MV and 1/V portfolios, this correction depends only on the number of
assets and the number of observations used for the in-sample calculation of the covariance matrix.
For example, assuming an in-sample period of 1 year (with approximately 252 trading days) and an
asset universe of 125 securities, equation (7) implies that the in-sample predicted portfolio variance
is twice as high as the realized out-of-sample portfolio variance.
2.2.3 Principal Risk Parity: Equally-weighted principal portfolios
In light of the above results, we present an alternative risk parity strategy, referred to as principal
risk parity (PRP). Similar to the 1/V and DRP portfolios, the PRP strategy invests in uncorrelated
risk sources as given by the PPs, but in a more natural fashion. The PRP portfolio budgets the
risk proportionally to each PP’s contribution to the total variance. As a result, the lion’s share
of the capital is allocated to the most significant principal portfolios, thus getting around the less
significant PPs. Technically, we are simply assigning equal weights to the PPs, prompting us to
call this strategy the principal risk parity strategy.7 To obtain the strategy weights wˆPRP , we need
to solve
wˆPRP = argmax
w∈C
MEnt(w), (20)
7As with the 1/V and DRP strategies, uniqueness of the asset allocation is guaranteed by means of sign constraints
based on the historically observed risk premia of the PPs.
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where MEnt is defined as
MEnt(w) = exp
(
−
N∑
i=1
q(w˜i) ln q(w˜i)
)
, (21)
and
q(w˜i) =
w˜2i∑N
i=1 wˆ
2
i
, i = 1, ..., N. (22)
The unconstrained version has a closed-form solution, proportional to
wˆPRP := Uˆ1. (23)
Intuition suggest that the SOR bias should be lower for the PRP than for the 1/V , MV, and DRP
portfolios, because PRP allocates away from low volatility PPs. Our calculations for PRP confirm
this intuition. For the realized variance of the PRP portfolio, we obtain
E
[
wˆ
′
PRPΩwˆPRP
]
= E
[
E
[
1
′
Uˆ
′
ΩUˆ1
∣∣∣Uˆ]] (A)= E [1′E [Uˆ′ΩˆUˆ∣∣∣Uˆ] 1] = E [1′Λˆ1] , (24)
where equation (A) relies on the fact that, conditional on Uˆ:
T × Ωˆ ∼ WN (Ω, T )⇒ T × Uˆ′ΩˆUˆ′ ∼ WN
(
UˆΩUˆ
′
, T
)
. (25)
Thus,
E
[
Uˆ
′
ΩˆUˆ
∣∣∣Uˆ] = Uˆ′ΩUˆ. (26)
The sample variance can be calculated as
E
[
wˆ
′
PRP ΩˆwˆPRP
]
= E
[
1
′
Uˆ
′
UˆΛˆUˆ
′
Uˆ1
]
= E
[
1
′
Λˆ1
]
. (27)
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Hence, the SOR bias of the PRP portfolio is
SOR(wˆPRP ) =
E
[
wˆ
′
PRPΩwˆPRP
]
E
[
wˆ
′
PRP ΩˆwˆPRP
] = 1. (28)
In contrast to equation (7) for the MV portfolio, and equation (19) for the DRP portfolio, the
sample variance of the PRP strategy can be considered to be an unbiased estimator of its true
variance, conditional on correctly estimating the correlation structure of the investment universe:
σˆ2PRP := wˆ
′
PRP ΩˆwˆPRP . (29)
2.3 Mitigating estimation risk
2.3.1 Eigenvalue adjustment
Not knowing the exact size of the SOR bias of a given portfolio strategy, Menchero, Wang, and Orr
(2012) developed an SOR-unbiased estimator of the covariance matrix. Their method is based on
the observation that each of the principal portfolios suffers from an SOR bias. In particular, the
SOR bias of a given PP is higher if its associated eigenvalue is smaller, see Table 1, Panel B.
Their method aims at eliminating the SOR bias of a given portfolio by correcting the SOR
bias of the underlying PPs. In this regard, one simulates asset returns that follow a joint normal
distribution with mean zero according to the sample covariance matrix. For each simulation s =
1, .., S, the authors compute the variances λk,s of the PPs for k = 1, .., N via a PCA of the covariance
matrix Ωs
Λs := U
′
sΩsUs. (30)
These variances are put into relation with the diagonal elements of a matrix Λ˜s, which is obtained
assuming the sample covariance matrix is the true covariance matrix of the assets’ returns, i.e.,
Λ˜s = U
′
sΩˆUs. (31)
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Averaging over all simulations gives a simulated SOR bias βk for every single PP k,
βk :=
1
S
S∑
s=1
√
λ˜k,s
λk,s
. (32)
For every PP, the sample variance (or eigenvalue) is multiplied by the square of βk, to build the
diagonal elements λeig−adjk , for k = 1, .., N of a matrix Λ
eig−adj containing SOR-corrected variances
λeig−adjk := β
2
kλk. (33)
The ensuing matrix Λeig−adj then replaces the diagonal matrix containing the sample eigenvalues
in the PCA decomposition to give an SOR-corrected estimator Ωˆeig−adj of the covariance matrix
of the assets’ returns:
Ωeig−adj = UˆΛeig−adjUˆ
′
. (34)
2.3.2 Bootstrapping
Another simulation-based technique for mitigating estimation risk can be easily obtained by boot-
strapping the asset returns instead of their corresponding eigenvectors. Portfolio optimization tech-
niques might be confounded by extreme values in the estimates of the covariance matrix, driven
by a low number of observations in the sample period. This problem might be avoided by boot-
strapping the asset returns from the sample period. Thus, the simulated covariance matrices Ωs,
for s = 1, .., S, can be used to compute optimal portfolio weights ws = f(Ωs) and finally—given
a sufficiently large number of simulations—the average portfolio weights across simulations might
prove to be more robust to estimation risk.
wbootstrap =
1
S
S∑
s=1
ws. (35)
This simple procedure aims at avoiding extreme and highly volatile asset allocations.
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2.3.3 Linear shrinkage
Lastly, a popular technique for mitigating estimation risk is the linear shrinkage estimator of Ledoit
and Wolf (2004a). The authors argue that extreme values in the variance–covariance matrix of asset
returns might often shift the optimal weights towards corner solutions. However, such portfolios
often disappoint out-of-sample. They suggest shrinking the sample covariance matrix of asset
returns Ωˆ towards a simple estimate of the covariance matrix Ω¯ consisting of one asset variance σ
and one asset covariance δ, i.e., ω¯i,j = σ, for i = j and ω¯i,j = δ, for i 6= j. In particular, they derive
an estimator as a convex combination of the two, i.e.,
Ωlin−shr = τΩ¯ + (1− τ)Ωˆ, (36)
where the weighting factor 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 is determined via optimization. The use of average values
for the variance and covariance components of the simplified covariance matrix, together with the
shrinkage procedure, ensures that the linear shrinkage estimator exhibits more moderate values
than would have been the case for the sample covariance matrix estimator, thus mitigating the
estimation risk.
3 Results
The aim of this section is to illustrate and confirm the results derived in Section 2 based on empirical
analyses of simulated as well as real market data. We first start with simulated data, as this allows
us to assume a “true” covariance matrix of asset returns. By means of Monte Carlo simulation,
we will show the effectiveness of the unbiased estimators of a portfolio’s variance in equations (7),
(19), and (29). Figure 1 shows the results of the Monte Carlo simulation for the Minimum Variance
(MV), Diversified Risk Parity (DRP), and Principal Risk Parity (PRP) portfolios. The results have
been obtained by constraining each portfolio to be fully invested and to have fixed expected return
R. For each target return R, a new sample covariance matrix Ωˆ is estimated on 50 daily returns for
each of 25 assets, simulated from a multivariate normal distribution with fixed mean and covariance
116
matrix Ω. In order to minimize noise in the simulation, we assume the mean return of each asset
to be known, and exclusively focus on the simulation of variances and covariances. For a selection
of target returns, various versions of a portfolio’s volatility are calculated and compared to each
other.
Figure 1. Monte Carlo Simulation: Risk–Return Profile vs. Efficient Frontier
The figure shows the risk return profile of mean variance (MV), diversified risk parity (DRP), and principal
risk parity (PRP) portfolios obtained via Monte Carlo simulation. Each panel is dedicated to a single
portfolio and shows the true efficient frontier, the naive forecast, the corrected forecast, and the realized
risk return profile from each simulation. Results are obtained by simulating 50 daily returns for each of 25
assets, assuming a multivariate normal distribution with known mean and covariance matrix.
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In particular, the curve labeled “True Frontier” is calculated assuming perfect knowledge of the
covariance matrix, i.e.,
√
w∗′Ωw∗, where w∗ represents the portfolio that is optimal in terms of the
corresponding optimization rule (i.e., eitherMV , DRP , or PRP ) given perfect knowledge about the
covariance matrix of asset returns. The dots labeled “Realized” risk represent the actual risk of the
portfolio, i.e.,
√
wˆ′Ωwˆ. The “Naive forecast” is the in-sample estimated volatility of the portfolio,
i.e.,
√
wˆ′Ωˆwˆ. The corrected forecast
√
wˆ′Ωˆwˆ
(
1− NT
)−1
(and
√
wˆ′Ωˆwˆ
(
1− NT
)−1/2
respectively)
is obtained by correcting the naive forecast according to equation (7) for the MV portfolio and
equation (19) for the DRP portfolio), whereas for the PRP portfolio, the naive forecast in equation
(29) is already unbiased and does not need to be corrected. Panel A shows how the naive forecast
of the MV portfolio’s volatility appears to be even better than the true efficient frontier, whereas
the realized volatility turns out to be rather higher. The same effect (with a lesser magnitude) can
be observed in Panel B for the DRP portfolio, whereas for PRP (see Panel C), the naive, or sample,
volatility forecast does not underestimate the realized volatility as expected.
In addition to simulated data, it is of interest to empirically test the results of Section 2 on
real market data. The use of real market data for the assessment of second-order risk is not
straightforward as it is in the case of simulated data, where the true covariance matrix of the asset
returns is known. To facilitate this, we make use of the so called SOR bias statistic to assess the
accuracy of a portfolio volatility forecast. This is calculated in the following way. For a set of
portfolio weights w = (wt)t=1,...,T the SOR bias statistics for t = t0 + 1, ..., T is given by
Bt0+t :=
rt
σˆt−1
:=
w′t−1Rdt√
w′t−1Ωˆt−1wt−1
, (37)
where t0 denotes the length of the in-sample rolling window, Ωˆt−1 denotes the sample covariance
matrix of asset returns, and wt−1 denotes the portfolio weights constructed out of de-meaned in-
sample returns Rdt−t0 , ...,R
d
t−1. De-meaned returns are considered for the calculation of the bias
statistics. This is done to prevent the measure to suffer from a bias induced by asset returns. As
rt := w
′
t−1Rdt is the realized de-meaned return of the portfolio at time t, Bt0+t can be considered as
a standardized return. Once calculated, the standard deviation of the SOR bias statistic provides
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a good approximation of the SOR bias of the considered portfolio when looked at in the context of
real market data.
As asset universe, we build on the Fama–French industry portfolios as provided by the Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).8 Industry portfolios are constructed by equally weighting
a selection of U.S. equities grouped by industry type according to the corresponding SIC codes
(Standard Industrial Classification). Table 1 shows a collection of the main statistics for CRSP
data composed of daily returns of U.S. equities grouped within ten Industry Portfolios over ten years
(from April 2007 to March 2017). These ten portfolios cover the sectors of: Consumer Non-Durables
(NoDur), Consumer Durables (Durbl), Manufacturing (Manuf), Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and
Products (Enrgy), Business Equipment (HiTech), Telephone and Television Transmission (Telcm),
Wholesale, Retail and Some Services (Shops), Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs (Hlth),
Utilities (Utils), and Other (Other). The same table also reports statistics for the ten Principal
Portfolios, the results of PCA decompositions of the asset universe composed by the ten Industry
Portfolios over the ten years considered. From the perspective of the SOR bias, it is interesting to
observe how the industry portfolios (constructed by equally weighting a selection of U.S. stocks)
exhibit SOR biases close to one (in particular ranging from 1.05 to 1.08), whereas the SOR bias
of the Principal Portfolios comes out inversely proportional to their volatility with values close to
one for the first three principal portfolios (1.04 for PP1, 1.01 for PP2, and 0.95 for PP3), then
increasing to values around 2–3 for the last principal portfolios (1.99 for PP9 and 2.73 for PP10).
Based on this asset universe, Figure 2 reports the SOR bias, calculated as the standard deviation
of the bias statistic in equation (37) over the ten-year period (from April 2007 to March 2017) for
a set of asset allocation strategies which have been presented in Section 2—1/N , MV, 1/V , DRP,
and PRP—together with a random strategy that has been used as an additional benchmark to
the 1/N portfolio.9 The displayed sample SOR bias statistics are in line with the SOR biases
theoretically derived in Section 2. The same figure reports SOR bias statistics conditional on the
8Datasets of from 5 up to 49 industry portfolios are available online. For more details please visit the website:
http : //mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html.
9The uniqueness of the 1/V , DRP, and PRP strategies is guaranteed by imposing a sign constraint on the PPs.
These have to carry a positive as well as historically observed risk premium, measured by a rolling time window of
12 months.
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application of risk-mitigating techniques, as described in Section 2. In addition to the SOR bias
derived by the portfolio optimization based on the sample co-variance matrix estimate, Figure 2
reports the SOR bias of the selected asset allocation strategies when the optimization routine is
run on each of the alternative estimators of the covariance matrix, namely, an estimate based on a
simple bootstrapping method, the linear shrinkage, and the eigenvalue-adjusted technique.
Figure 2. Second-Order Risk Bias under Risk Mitigation Methodologies
The figure provides the second-order risk bias under the application of various estimation risk mitigation
methodologies for various asset allocation strategies: the equally weighted portfolio (1/N), a random portfolio
(Rand.), the minimum variance (MV), the inverse variance (1/V ), the diversified risk parity (DRP), and
the principal risk parity portfolio (PRP). The SOR bias is calculated as the standard deviation of the bias
statistic in (37) over a ten-year time period, from April 2007 to March 2017. The bias statistic is calculated
as of every day based on a rolling window of 30 daily returns. The asset universe considered consists in the
ten industry portfolios provided by the CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) and described in Table
1. The SOR bias is provided without (Sample) and with the application of an estimation risk mitigation
methodology: either the bootstrap, the linear shrinkage, or the eigenvalue adjusting methodology, which
were described in Section 2.3.
1/N Random MV 1/V DRP PRP
0.5
1
1.5
2 Sample
Bootstrap
Linear Shrinkage
Eigenvalues Adjusted
As expected, the equally weighted portfolio and the random strategy do not appear to suffer
from an SOR bias: the reported SOR biases, 1.06 for 1/N (and 1.05 for the random strategy)
are in line with the SOR bias of the single industry portfolios listed in Table 1, and ranging from
1.05 to 1.08, and are mainly induced by the finite time horizon considered and the reliance on
real market data rather than simply simulated data. In contrast to these two control strategies,
the MV portfolios SOR bias is rather high at 1.60 (sample) and 1.56 (bootstrap)—i.e., the realized
volatility of the MV portfolio is about 60% higher than the in-sample volatility. The SOR bias drops
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significantly to 1.49 under linear shrinkage and even more, to 1.06, under the eigenvalue-adjustment
method. This observation is in line with the average SOR biases of the single Industry Portfolios.
The 1/V portfolio displays SOR biases, slightly higher but similar in magnitude to those of the MV
portfolio. The 1/V portfolio has an SOR bias of 1.71 (sample version) and 1.67 (bootstrapping).
The SOR bias drops to 1.56 under linear shrinkage of the sample co-variance matrix and to 1.09
under the eigenvalue adjustment. The DRP strategy is less affected by SOR bias than the MV
and 1/V strategies. Its SOR bias is approximately the square root of those of the 1/V and MV
strategies, as derived in Section 2. We especially observe an SOR bias of 1.42 for the sample and
1.44 for the bootstrap strategies. Applying linear shrinkage or the eigenvalue adjustment appear
to give rise to SOR biases of 1.35 and 1.09, respectively. The PRP portfolio displays an SOR bias
of 1.10 in its sample and eigenvalue-adjusted versions. The application of bootstrapping and linear
shrinkage leaves the bias almost unchanged, at 1.10. The observation of SOR bias statistics slightly
higher than one, reported for the strategies in their eigenvalue-adjusted versions, is mainly related
to the use of a finite sample of real market data.
In addition to the SOR bias over the whole of the considered time period, Figure 3 depicts the
SOR bias statistics for the analyzed portfolio construction strategies over time. The ranking of
the SOR bias inferred from Figure 2 also applies over time. The SOR biases of 1/N and random
strategies oscillate around the expected value of 1. Two major deviations from 1 can be observed
for the SOR bias of the 1/N strategy in Panel A, prior to the two equity crises in 2000 and 2008.
Panel C (MV) and Panel D (1/V ) are quite similar over time. Panel E reports the SOR bias over
time for the DRP portfolio, which is less volatile when compared with the SOR bias of MV and
1/V strategies. Panel F gives the SOR bias of the PRP portfolio, which fluctuates around 1 with
a slight upward bias. Also, it is less sensitive to the application of methods to mitigate estimation
risk. Similarly, applying methods to mitigate the estimation risk over time is in line with the effects
observed on average.
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Figure 3. Second-Order Risk Bias Over Time
The figure shows the second-order risk bias over time for various asset allocation strategies and risk mitigation
methodologies (as described in Section 2.3. Each panel represents the SOR bias over time for an individual
portfolio strategy both with and without the application of the various risk mitigation methodologies. SOR
bias is calculated via a rolling window of 30 daily returns. Portfolios are constructed out of the ten industry
portfolios described in Table 1. Data used range from April 2007 to March 2017.
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Figures 4 and 5 both illustrate the SOR bias for MV, DRP, and PRP portfolios as a function
of the number of in-sample observations T and the number of assets N . The results proposed in
Figure 5 are derived based on a fixed number of industry portfolios (ten) by letting the number of
observations T vary from 20 up to 60 daily returns, giving T/N ratios of from 2 up to 6.
Figure 4. Correcting Second-Order Risk Bias for Varying T/N Ratios
The figure shows the second-order risk bias (calculated via SOR bias statistic) for the MV portfolio, the
DRP portfolio and the PRP portfolio under varying ratios of number of monthly returns (T ) considered
in-sample over number of industry portfolios (N). The number of industry portfolios is kept constant within
each panel. For Panel A, a ratio T/N = 3 corresponds to the case of 5 industry portfolios and 15 monthly in-
sample observations. Panel B displays the SOR bias constructed out of 10 industry portfolios, Panel C with
30 industry portfolios, and Panel D reports the SOR bias based on 48 industry portfolios. Additionally, for
MV and DRP strategies, the corrected SOR bias, using estimators from equations (7), and (19) are reported.
Results are derived using the 10 industry portfolios described in Table 1 and analogous industry portfolios
(5, 30, and 48) as consistently provided by CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices). For more details
please visit the website: http : //mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html.
Results are generated using data ranging from April 2007 to March 2017.
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Figure 5. SOR Bias under Risk Mitigation Methodologies for Varying T/N Ratios
The figure shows the second-order risk bias (calculated via SOR bias statistic) for the MV portfolio, the
DRP portfolio and the PRP portfolio under varying ratios of the number of daily returns (T ) considered
in-sample to the number of industry portfolios (N). The number of industry portfolios is kept constant at
10. Consequently, a ratio T/N = 3 corresponds to the case of 10 industry portfolios and 30 daily in-sample
observations. Panel A displays the SOR bias of strategies constructed on the sample covariance matrix.
Panel B, C, and D reports the SOR bias conditional on strategies being derived from the corresponding
estimator of the covariance matrix: bootstrapping for panel B, linear shrinkage for panel C, and eigenvalue-
adjustment for panel D. Results are derived with the asset universe described in Table 1 and results are
generated using data ranging from April 2007 to March 2017.
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The results displayed are consistent with the theory highlighted in Section 2. The MV exhibits
the highest SOR bias, which increases with a decreasing number of observations. The DRP has
a lower SOR bias than the MV. The PRP is unbiased, independently of the number of in-sample
observations considered. For the MV and DRP portfolios, the figure also reports the SOR bias after
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application of the correction highlighted in equation (7) and equation (19), respectively. These
appear close to 1, as expected. Panels A to D report the same analysis and vary in the choice
of the estimate for the input covariance matrix to portfolio optimization. Panel A reports the
results derived from the sample covariance matrix, Panel B repeats the same analysis averaged
over multiple bootstrapped covariance matrices, Panel C shows the SOR bias derived using the
linear shrinkage estimator, whereas in Panel D the sample covariance matrix used is modified
by the eigenvalue adjustment. From this figure we observe how the effect of risk mitigation is
homogeneous and proportional to the SOR bias over the T/N ratio.
Figure 4 is derived similarly to Figure 5 (looking at the same T/N ratios) but with a varying
number of Industry Portfolios. CRSP provides alternative groupings of the same U.S. equities in
Industry Portfolios at various granularities. Panels A to D in Figure 4 are derived based on CRSP
groupings of 5, 10, 30, and 48 Industry Portfolios respectively. The number of Industry Portfolios
considered seems to have a limited effect on the resulting SOR bias across strategies. Slightly higher
figures are observed for lower numbers of assets and lower numbers of observations, most probably
a result of noise rather than a deviation from the theory highlighted in Section 2.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have provided theoretical and empirical evidence on the contribution of second-
order risk to realized volatility for alternative risk parity strategies. In particular, we demonstrate
that alternative risk parity strategies, such as diversified and principal risk parity, are significantly
less sensitive to second-order risk than the classical minimum variance portfolio. In this regard,
an adequate allocation of the risk budget along uncorrelated risk sources mitigates potential SOR
biases, e.g., by allocating away from lower eigenvalue portfolios, or by relying more on the correlation
structure than on the estimates of the eigenvalues in portfolio construction. Taking this insight
to an extreme, we show how the principal risk parity strategy which attaches equal weights to
uncorrelated risk sources exhibits low to no SOR bias. Additionally, we provide empirical evidence
for the eigenvalue adjustment being the most effective in correcting for the SOR bias.
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5 Appendix
For the expression
E
[
Ωˆ−1/2ΩΩˆ−1/2
∣∣∣Uˆ] ,
which we dub the “Bias Matrix,” we cannot derive an analytical expression. Thus, we verify the
validity of our approximation (C),
E
[
Ωˆ−1/2ΩΩˆ−1/2
∣∣∣Uˆ] (C)' (1− N
T
)−1
E
[
1
′
Uˆ
′
Uˆ1
]
=
(
1− N
T
)−1
N, (38)
via a Monte Carlo simulation. The derivation is done as follows. First a set of T asset returns for
each of N assets is selected and the corresponding sample covariance matrix is calculated. This
same matrix is assumed to be the true covariance matrix Ω. Second, this matrix is used to simulate
a set of jointly normally distributed asset returns with mean 0 and covariance matrix Ω. For the
simulated set of asset returns, the sample covariance Ωˆ, as well as the term Ωˆ−1/2ΩΩˆ−1/2 are
calculated. This procedure is repeated 100,000 times, and the average of Ωˆ−1/2ΩΩˆ−1/2 gives an
approximation for E
[
Ωˆ−1/2ΩΩˆ−1/2
∣∣∣Uˆ].
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Figure 6. Monte Carlo Simulation: Estimation of DRP “Bias Matrix”
The figure shows the “Bias Matrix” of the Diversified Risk Parity (DRP) portfolio constructed via Monte
Carlo simulation from the ten industry portfolios listed in Table 1. Panel A uses an in-sample time window
of one month (corresponding to 21 daily returns). In Panels B, C, and D, the size of the in-sample time
window increases to two, six, and twelve months, respectively. Panel E reports the average diagonal value
of the Bias Matrix as a function of the ratio T/N . Panel F reports the average, maximum and minimum
off-diagonal elements of the Bias Matrix as a function of the ratio T/N . Results are derived using data from
April 2016 to March 2017.
-1
0
10 9
1
8 107 9
2
6 875 6
3
4 53 432 21 10 0
-1
0
10 9
1
8 107 9
2
6 875 6
3
4 53 432 21 10 0
-1
0
10 9
1
8 107 9
2
6 875 6
3
4 53 432 21 10 0
-1
0
10 9
1
8 107 9
2
6 875 6
3
4 53 432 21 10 0
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Average diagonal values
(1-N/T)-1
(1-N/T)-2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Average off-diagonal values
Maximum off-diagonal values
Minimum off-diagonal values
129
Part V
Curriculum Vitae
130
Simone Bernardi
Curriculum Vitae
"Success is the ability to go from failure to failure without
losing your enthusiasm." – Winston Churchill
Personal Details
Birth 19.12.1986 (Lodrino,TI,CH)
Citizenship Swiss
Education
2012-2018 Doctoral Student, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.
2012-2012 FRM certification - Financial Risk Manager, GARP - Global Association of
Risk Professionals, Zurich, Switzerland.
2010-2011 MSc in Quantitative Finance, University of Zurich and Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology, Zurich, Switzerland.
2009-2010 MSc in Mathematics, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, Switzerland.
2005-2008 BSc in Mathematics, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, Switzerland.
Work Experience
2012-current Head of Rating, LGD, RWA & Capital, UBS AG, Zurich, Switzerland.
Rank: Director, Department: Credit Methodology Retail
2010-2012 Quantitative Analyst, ZZ Group, Vitznau, Switzerland.
Portfolio Management Program (AUM 1.5m)
131

